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BODY CAMERAS AND THE PATH TO
REDEEM PRIVACY LAW*
WOODROW HARTZOG**
From a privacy perspective, the movement towards police body
cameras seems ominous. The prospect of a surveillance device
capturing massive amounts of data concerning people’s most
vulnerable moments is daunting. These concerns are
compounded by the fact that there is little consensus and few
hard rules on how and for whom these systems should be built
and used. But in many ways, this blank slate is a gift. Law and
policy makers are not burdened by the weight of rules and
technologies created in a different time for a different purpose.
These surveillance and data technologies will be modern. Many
of the risks posed by the systems will be novel as well. Our
privacy rules must keep up.
In this Article, I argue that police body cameras are an
opportunity to chart a path past privacy law’s most vexing
missteps and omissions. Specifically, lawmakers should avoid
falling back on the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard.
Instead, they should use body cameras to embrace more nuanced
theories of privacy, such as trust and obscurity. Trust-based
relationships can be used to counter the harshness of the thirdparty doctrine. The value of obscurity reveals the misguided
nature of the argument that there is “no privacy in public.”
Law and policy makers can also better protect privacy by
creating rules that address how body cameras and data
technologies are designed in addition to how they are used. Since
body-camera systems implicate every stage of the modern data
lifecycle from collection to disclosure, they can serve as a useful
model across industry and government. But if law and policy
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makers hope to show how privacy rules can be improved, they
must act quickly. The path to privacy law’s redemption will stay
clear for only so long.
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INTRODUCTION
Body-worn cameras on every police officer in America are
understandably seen as a serious threat to privacy. People have deep
concerns about the way in which this potentially pervasive and
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powerful surveillance infrastructure is implemented and regulated.1
The prospect of being watched all the time, especially in our most
vulnerable moments, is daunting.2 So is the risk that comes from the
colossal amount of data that will be created, stored, processed, and
shared through the use of body camera systems.3
Much of this concern stems from the fact that, until relatively
recently, there were few specific rules for how body cameras should
be built, used, or how the data they collected should be treated.4 This
left police departments, often in conjunction with third-party vendors,
to come up with their own rules.5 Unsurprisingly, the rules we have
now, which include everything from state statutes and municipal
ordinances to department policies and contracts with vendors, are
inconsistent and sporadic. It seems that there is little consensus for
key questions such as when the cameras will run and who will be able
to tell when they are on; how long footage is kept and who can see it;
how footage is secured; and whether biometrics can be used.6
In fact, the one thing that seems clear from the body-worn
camera debate is that with so many different players and interests
involved, it is hard to agree on anything.7 Lawmakers and advocates
1. See Bryce Clayton Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-Legal Study of Police
Body Camera Adoption, Privacy, and Public Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J.
1329, 1139 (2017).
2. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1808
(2015); Newell, supra note 1, at 1136−37; Katie Farden, Note, Recording a New Frontier in
Evidence-Gathering: Police Body-Worn Cameras and Privacy Doctrines in Washington
State, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 271, 276 (2016); Erik Nielsen, Comment, Fourth
Amendment Implications of Police-Worn Body Cameras, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 134
(2016). People use several different terms to describe this technology, including “bodyworn cameras” and “body cameras.” The terms will be used synonymously in this article.
3. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Beyond Surveillance: Data Control and Body Cameras, 14
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 133, 133−36 (2016), https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php
/surveillance-and-society/article/view/cdebate4/bc4 [https://perma.cc/36PT-EBZZ].
4. See id. at 133.
5. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101 (2017) (“The relationships
between surveillance technology vendors and police departments show the increasing
degree to which private companies can guide, shape, and limit what the public police
do.”).
6. See Alexandra Mateescu, Alex Rosenblat & danah boyd, Police Body-Worn
Cameras 2, 16–19 (Feb. 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.datasociety.net/pubs
/dcr/PoliceBodyWornCameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJF4-FBBS].
7. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN,
BODY
WORN
CAMERAS:
A
POLICY
SCORECARD
(2017),
POLICE
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/GSV7-9VEK], for a useful reference
comparing the different body camera policies on criteria such as policy available, officer
discretion, personal privacy, officer review, footage retention, footage misuse, footage
access, and biometric use.
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of body cameras use purported foundational values such as
“accountability” and “transparency” in such a vague way that the
specific purposes of the cameras are not even clear.8 Are body
cameras meant to provide evidence for when force is used? Or
perhaps they are meant to more generally encourage good behavior
by reminding people they are being watched? Or are there other
goals for body cameras? Should body cameras primarily benefit the
subjects of police interaction, the police officers themselves, the
public, or all of the above? Which values are paramount in bodycamera systems: accountability, transparency, or privacy? And what
do we even mean by those concepts? Privacy, in particular, is spacious
and could mean a host of things.9 How police departments and
vendors answer those questions will determine both how effective and
how harmful police body-worn cameras can be.10
But amidst the chaos lies opportunity. The relatively blank slate
for body-worn cameras that is creating so much risk is also an
opportunity to take a fresh new approach to the rules of surveillance,
data protection, and privacy in public records. States, cities, and
police departments need not cling to the entrenched and awkward
rules out of inertia. Due process and reasonable care can be
implemented in many different ways.11
Most importantly, those creating rules for body cameras have the
opportunity to avoid the broken parts of privacy law that have
confounded courts, lawmakers, and officials for years. For example,
8. See Caren Myers Morrison, Body Camera Obscura: The Semiotics of Police Video,
54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 791, 795 (2017); Kami C. Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras:
A Primer on Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 884−87 (2015)
(identifying possible body camera utilities as identifying the use of excessive, deterring
police misconduct and promoting officer safety, force, and use as a training tool to correct
structural problems within police departments.); Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn
Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1378 (2018) (explaining that there has been a “laundry list
of advantages” for body-worn cameras); Mateescu, et al., supra note 6, at 16−19
(discussing potential issues with body-worn cameras depending on the manner in which
policy allows them to be used); danah boyd & Alex Rosenblat, It’s Not Too Late to Get
Body Cameras Right, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2015/05/its-not-too-late-to-get-body-cameras-right/393257/
[https://perma.cc
/2VQR-WLNN].
9. See Simmons, supra note 8, at 889–90 (showing examples of the concerns relating
to privacy and who benefits from the use of body cameras).
10. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN,
supra note 7 (noting that police departments in various cities addressed privacy in
different ways while some police departments did not address privacy at all).
11. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF BODY-WORN
CAMERA BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 19–21 (2016), https://constitutionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/BodyCamerasRptOnline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2JVA-4V35]
(addressing issues of due process and chain of custody).
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there is a growing discomfort with the idea that there is no privacy in
public or in information shared with third parties.12 Lawmakers have
too often ignored the design of information technologies. They too
often conceive of public records as exclusively binary, where the only
choices seem to be either to keep it hidden or to release it to the
world, with no restrictions.13 People too often use publicly accessible
information to exploit and harass others or expose them in harmful
and unjustified ways.14 Entrenched privacy regimes have to grapple
with these problems that have been created by old and narrow
conceptualizations of privacy and ineffective strategies to protect it.
Body-worn camera rules do not have to repeat the same mistakes.
In this Article, I argue body cameras are an opportunity for law
and policy makers to create frameworks that do not repeat privacy
law’s most vexing missteps and omissions. In doing so, law and policy
makers can chart the path for better surveillance and data rules in
other contexts. The path to privacy law’s redemption has both a
theoretical and practical component. Policy makers can use body
cameras to embrace more nuanced theories of privacy in law. They
can also use body cameras to better protect privacy in practice by
embracing a holistic approach to body-camera systems that include
rules regarding how body camera and data technologies are built, in
addition to how they are used. A sound theoretical and practical
framework for body cameras can serve as a model for how to better
balance notions of privacy with competing values like government
transparency and free speech in other contexts involving surveillance
and data protection. Also, a new framework can show how to move
beyond ill-fitting theories of privacy that either gradually erode
protection for people or awkwardly group information and contexts
into “public” or “private” categories.
My goal for this Article is modest within the entire body camera
debate, as I am concerned mainly with how these technologies affect
privacy. There are critical questions regarding free speech,
government accountability, racial justice and freedom from bias,
procedural fairness, and evidentiary concerns that lawmakers, judges,
and police departments must answer, in addition to data and

12. See infra Section II.B.2.
13. See infra Section I.B.3.
14. See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL
THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (providing examples of harmful effects of personal
information being used in harmful ways); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:
Privacy, Public Records, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2002).
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surveillance issues.15 By focusing only on privacy, I do not mean to
diminish the importance of government accountability, equality, due
process, and press freedom. In fact, my hope is that the framework
proposed in this Article would help to better balance privacy among
the other values implicated by body cameras. Nor do I directly
address the efficacy of body-worn cameras for their stated goals,

15. See Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the Unintentional
Consequences of Technological Advances and Ensuring a Role for Community
Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 985, 988–89 (2016); Mary D. Fan, Justice
Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 898
(2017) (“[T]here is often a difference between the legally relevant truth and the depiction
captured on video. Care must be taken therefore to apply the proper perceptual yardsticks
and reserve interpretive questions for the appropriate fact-finders.”); Mary D. Fan,
Hacking Qualified Immunity: Camera Power and Civil Rights Settlements, 8 ALA. C.R. &
C.L.L. REV. 51, 52 (2017); David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head
Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 357, 359–60 (2010) (“What is more, this technology can serve numerous other
functions that police will find not just useful, but welcome. This versatility makes the idea
one of the most promising possibilities for assuring police accountability and compliance
with the law to come along in many years.” (footnote omitted)); Iesha S. Nunes, “Hands
Up, Don’t Shoot”: Police Misconduct and the Need for Body Cameras, 67 FLA. L. REV.
1811, 1815 (2015) (“[B]ody cameras will not only help to increase accountability on behalf
of law enforcement, but will also increase the public’s trust in those whose duty it is to
protect and serve.”); Matthew R. Segal & Carol Rose, Race, Technology, and Policing, 59
BOS. B.J. lxii, lxii (2015) (“Police departments in Massachusetts and around the nation
face heightened scrutiny about racial bias in their stop-and-frisk and use-of-force
procedures.”); Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to
Record the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1566 (2016) (“With videotaped interrogations, for
instance, individuals viewing a video of a confession are more likely to believe the police
are being coercive if the video is shot from the point of view of the person being
interrogated, pointing at a police officer. When the video is pointed at the suspect, in
contrast, viewers are more likely to judge the confession voluntary. Something similar
occurs with videos of police conduct: when shot from the point of view of the police
officer, as a body camera will do, the ‘camera perspective bias’ will cause the viewer to
sympathize with the officer’s actions more than they would with a video taken from a
neutral angle or from the perspective of the person engaging with the police officer.”
(footnote omitted)); Howard M. Wasserman, Epilogue: Moral Panics and Body Cameras,
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 845, 848 (2015) (“Even as recent events confirm that body cameras
(and the resulting video) are not the infallible solution to police misconduct or to disputes
over police-citizen encounters, they reaffirm cameras as worthwhile public policy offering
some help in understanding and resolving conflicts between police and their
communities.”); Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U.
L. REV. 831, 833 (2015) [hereinafter Wasserman, Moral Panics] (“While body cameras are
a good idea and police departments should be encouraged and supported in using them, it
is nevertheless important not to see them as a magic bullet. The public discussion needs
less absolute rhetoric and more open recognition of the limitations of this technology.”);
V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Body Cameras and Criminal Discovery, 104 Geo. L.J. 1581,
1584−85 (2016); Kyle J. Maury, Note, Police Body-Worn Camera Policy: Balancing the
Tension Between Privacy and Public Access in State Laws, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479,
481 (2016); Roseanna Sommers, Note, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce
Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1312 (2016).
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though the evidence on their efficacy seems tentative and
inconclusive, at best.16 My goal in this Article is ambitious in one
sense, however. Body-camera regimes could inspire future
surveillance and data rules, amendments, and opinions that involve
other technologies and practices such as biometrics, genomic data,
drones, and artificial intelligence. Sustainable and harnessed bodycamera regimes could serve as the model, or at least inspiration, for
other technologies that sense, store, process, and share information.
My argument proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I argue that the
relatively blank slate for police body cameras presents an opportunity
for law and policy makers to embrace new privacy notions and
strategies that move beyond some of the vexing and misguided
concepts entrenched in other areas of surveillance, data protection,
and public records law. I briefly review the impetus for police body
cameras, the varying interests at stake, and the public and
governmental push to adopt use of body cameras. Then, I review the
various laws and policies that currently govern body cameras to
demonstrate that there is little consensus on both first-order
principles, as well as the specifics about what can be collected, how it
can be stored and processed, and who can access it. I end this Part by
making the case that body cameras are a promising technology to use
to chart new trajectories for privacy law because they implicate a wide
range of privacy-risky activity like surveillance, data processing, and
public dissemination. Also, because body-camera rules are developed
from the ground up instead of at the federal level, these rules can be
calibrated through experimentation and, ultimately, serve as a firmer
foundation for stable change.17
In Part II, I address how body cameras are an opportunity to
improve how privacy is theorized within the law. I argue that to
provide a more nuanced theory of privacy in law, policymakers
should abandon the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test for body
camera rules. The test is broken and unsalvageable. Lawmakers,

16. Barak Ariel, Police Body Cameras in Large Police Departments, 106 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 729, 729 (2016); Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 15, at 837−40 (“We
can only speculate whether recording will deter bad behavior and incentivize good
behavior by police and the public. The technology and its use by actual police are too new
to know its true effects. . . . [V]ideo does not ‘speak for itself.’”); Mayor Muriel Bowser,
Randomized Controlled Trial Metropolitan Police Dep’t Body-Worn Camera Program,
LAB@D.C., http://bwc.thelab.dc.gov/#home [https://perma.cc/H8NB-MGCX].
17. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN,
supra note 7 (showing that state and local governments are implementing rules and
policies for body cameras in support of the argument that states are experimenting with
different rules).
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courts, officers, and citizens have been tied into knots trying to divine
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in particular
contexts.18 The test has given birth to two of the most misguided
notions in all of privacy law—the idea that there is no privacy in
“public” or in things shared with third parties. Instead, policymakers
should create body camera rules that are focused on protecting more
nuanced notions of privacy such as trust and obscurity. Trust is a
more accurate description of the value to be protected with data
storage and processing rules. Trust is also a good construct to guide
vendor recipients of body camera data. Obscurity, the notion that we
or our data are unlikely to be found or observed in most contexts, is a
much more accurate description of the value threatened by
surveillance, data collection, and increased data accessibility.19
In Part III, I address how body cameras are an opportunity to
show how privacy law can be more pliable, holistic, and calibrated to
serve multiple values and mitigate abuses of power. I argue that the
introduction of body-camera laws provide an opportune time to make
a few practical adjustments to address privacy law’s design gap.20 The
way that digital and surveillance technologies and systems are built
will shape how they are used. Too often, privacy law focuses
exclusively on the activities of the surveiller, data collector, or data
recipient.21 Rules for how surveillance technologies and data systems
are built and used are also important for body camera systems. I
conclude this article by proposing a more holistic framework for
states, cities, and departments. This framework combines rules for
data practices with rules for the design of technologies. It also
embraces a more nuanced conceptualization of privacy. It will help
policymakers better respect people’s obscurity, trust, and autonomy
while balancing the goals of government accountability and freedom
of the press. When the concept of privacy is more specifically
articulated, it can be better balanced with clearly defined goals
relating to public records and speech while avoiding the conflicts

18. See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511–
12 (2010) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence.”).
19. See infra Section II.B.2.
20. See generally HARTZOG, supra note 14 (explaining there is a general lack of focus
on design when it comes to privacy policies). But see Ari Ezra Waldman, A Statistical
Analysis of Privacy Policy Design, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
103–05), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141351 [https://perma.cc
/A239-SCFK]; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
74, 78–79 (2018).
21. See HARTZOG, supra note 14 (manuscript at 4).
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inherent in trying to articulate what is a “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”
If body cameras are to serve as a model for privacy law,
policymakers must act soon. Body-camera laws are already being
passed.22 The window of opportunity to redeem privacy law is closing.
If lawmakers do not get these rules right, we will be installing yet
another omni-surveillance and personal data infrastructure based on
notions of privacy that are increasingly myopic and untenable.
I. BODY CAMERAS ARE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW HOW TO FIX
PRIVACY LAW
Body cameras have been around for a little while, but they are
not yet fully entrenched. In this Part, I will describe why body
cameras present a window of opportunity for policymakers to show
how to bypass privacy law’s most common mistakes. While many
police departments have created policies regarding the use of body
cameras, not all states have passed formal legislation specifically
addressing the policy of body-worn cameras.23 Even states that have
passed body camera-specific legislation are still working on how to
implement it, and the window for change remains open.24 Among
those bodies that have passed rules, many important issues regarding
things like access and the use of biometrics remain unresolved and in
need of attention.25 With a little imagination and a lot of hard work
and political capital, body-camera law could serve as a model for how
to improve information privacy law across the board. But lawmakers
must act quickly and decisively. The window for change will only be
open for a short time. Once states pass rules and law enforcement
departments implement the systems, the concrete hardens.
A. The Rush to Implement Body Cameras with No Clear Plan
Body-worn cameras are not entirely new. The idea to use small
surveillance cameras mounted on the bodies of police officers has

22. See Stoughton, supra note 8, at 1380 (explaining that there is a “laundry list of
advantages” for body-worn cameras and addressing the rapid rate at which police body
cameras are being implemented throughout the United States).
23. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN,
supra note 7 (noting that a few cities in some states have put in place body-camera rules
and -policies).
24. See generally Mateescu et al., supra note 6 (noting that there are areas of body
camera-policy which still need to be addressed even in cities where there are policies
regarding body cameras).
25. Id.
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been the subject of public debate at least as early as the 2000s.26 Dash
cams have been around in some form since the 1960s and have been
in common use since the 1990s.27 However, when Michael Brown was
shot and killed by Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson
under controversial circumstances, the public outcry for policy body
cameras intensified.28 The demand to record police interactions with
the public also increased following the deaths of African American
men Philando Castile, Freddie Grey, Samuel DuBose, Sean Bell, Eric
Garner, Alton Sterling, and others, all of whom died following police
encounters.29
Remarkably, there is a convergence of interest in seeking to
implement police body cameras. Governments, law enforcement
organizations, police officers unions, civil rights organizations, the
general public, and certainly the body-camera equipment and data
industry all, to some degree, support the implementation of bodyworn cameras for police officers.30 Unfortunately, there is little clear
consensus on what the rules for body cameras should be or how they
should be implemented. Body-camera laws vary dramatically from
city to city and state to state with respect to officer discretion over
camera activation, footage review rights for officers, privacy,
biometric use, and footage retention, use, and accessibility.31 Even
model policies proposed by unions and civil rights organizations are

26. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 15, at 360–61 (discussing the use of body-worn
cameras in the United Kingdom and the United States as early as 2005).
27. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON
MODERN POLICING 5 (2004), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/IACPIn-CarCameraReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y9YD-HCPY].
28. See Adam Lidgett, How Body Camera Manufacturers Are Cashing in on Michael
Brown’s Ferguson Death, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/howbody-camera-manufacturers-are-cashing-michael-browns-ferguson-death-2123677
[https://perma.cc/W3QM-68W4]; Josh Sanburn, The One Battle Michael Brown’s Family
Will Win, TIME (Nov. 26, 2014), http://time.com/3606376/police-cameras-fergusonevidence/ [https://perma.cc/KT5U-MUGW] (“In the weeks after Brown’s death, numerous
law-enforcement agencies around the U.S. began experimenting with body cameras.
Anaheim, Calif.; Denver; Miami Beach; Washington, D.C.; and even Ferguson have all
begun outfitting officers with cameras or announced plans to start. The movement
Brown’s family called for the night Wilson was cleared has actually been growing since the
day their son was killed.”).
29. See Daniel Funke & Tina Susman, From Ferguson to Baton Rouge: Deaths of
Black Men and Women at the Hands of Police, L.A. TIMES (July 12, 2016, 3:45 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-police-deaths-20160707-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc
/X5GM-E4TU)].
30. Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 1, 7.
31. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN,
supra note 7.
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different from each other along similar fault lines.32 The policies
developed by local police departments also vary, to the extent that
they are even accessible.33 And this is to say nothing of the different
kinds of contracts between governments and third-party body-camera
equipment and data vendors. These contracts shape the influence that
private industry has over the surveillance technologies and the data
they create.34
The general ambiguity and uncertain goals for police body
cameras likely play a role in its collective appeal to the relevant
parties. It is not clear if the cameras are meant to change behavior,
provide evidence of interactions, or increase public trust (or all of
those things).35 So for now, body cameras can be all things to all
people. But, if body cameras are to be safe and sustainable, specific
first-order principles should be identified and agreed upon. Sooner or
later, concrete rules will need to be articulated in those jurisdictions
that have yet to regulate the use of body cameras. This includes rules
designed to protect the privacy of those surveilled and implicated by
surveillance.
B.

The Window of Opportunity to Change Privacy Law

Given how long courts and lawmakers have been wrestling with
privacy issues, you might be tempted to think they would have it
worked out by now. Sadly, you would be wrong. Despite over one
hundred years of attempting to create a sound body of privacy rules
and jurisprudence, courts, lawmakers, and the general public remain
confused about how to best protect the protean concept of privacy.36
32. Compare A Model Act for Regulating the Use of Wearable Body Cameras by Law
Enforcement, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearablebody-cameras-law-enforcement?redirect=model-act-regulating-use-wearable-body-cameraslaw-enforcement [https://perma.cc/R7DA-4TQD] (“A law enforcement officer who is
wearing a body camera shall notify the subject(s) of the recording that they are being
recorded by a body camera as close to the inception of the encounter as is reasonably
possible.”), with “Model” Body-Camera Policy, LAB. REL. INFO. SYS. (Sept. 12, 2014),
https://lris.com/2014/09/12/model-body-camera-policy/
[http://perma.cc/5DMG-KSGS]
(follow “LRIS” hyperlink; then follow “PDF Version” hyperlink) (“Officers have no
obligation to stop recording in response to a citizen’s request if the recording is pursuant
to an investigation, arrest, lawful search, or the circumstances clearly dictate that
continued recording is necessary. However, officers . . . may evaluate the situation and . . .
honor the citizen’s request.”).
33. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN,
supra note 7.
34. For more information on these contracts, see Joh, supra note 5.
35. See Stoughton, supra note 8, at 1380–1400 (discussing views and potential benefits
of body cameras).
36. See infra Part II.
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Admittedly, creating rules around a concept as complex as privacy is
a daunting task. For starters, the concept defies definition.37 Is privacy
about secrecy, intimacy, control, identity, or dignity? Or something
else entirely? Regardless of how it is defined, it is often in tension
with other values, such as free speech, safety, accountability, and
innovation. Sometimes, privacy means rules about what other people
can disclose. Sometimes, privacy means law enforcement might have
difficulty obtaining information it needs to keep people safe. Privacy
is also an astonishingly cross-cutting concept within legal systems,
having relevance in the law of torts, contracts, consumer protection,
constitutional free expression, self-incrimination and due process
rights, evidence, equity, and many others.38 Statutes that address
government search and seizure, public health, electronic surveillance,
data protection, public records, and many more all accommodate
some notion of privacy.
The problem is that courts and lawmakers do not seem to be
getting any closer to a workable consensus. The debate over what
constitutes a privacy “harm” is still wide open.39 Courts demand
“concrete” injury, but even that remains elusive.40 Is increased risk an
injury in itself? Anxiety over information misuse?41 Regulatory
agencies like the FTC are accused of overreach in their failure to
properly and publicly identify privacy harms and balance them with
privacy benefits.42 Courts and lawmakers are struggling to articulate
37. Cf. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479–82
(2006) (discussing the present lack of consensus surrounding the definition of “privacy”
and its associated body of laws and suggesting a taxonomy to aid in its development).
38. See, e.g., id. at 483; Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power:
Towards a Re-Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 129
(2006).
39. See Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L. J. 1131, 1133 (2010)
(offering an account of privacy harm “delineating [its] specific boundaries”); Robert L.
Rabin, Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security, and Tort Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 313,
324−28 (2017).
40. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548−50 (2016) (ruling that because
the Ninth Circuit “failed to fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and
particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete”); Rabin, supra note 39, at 327–28.
41. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data
Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 754 (2018) (“Most courts consider plaintiffs’ fear,
anxiety, and psychic distress about their increased risk of identity theft and other abuses
too remote to warrant recognition.”).
42. See Angelique Carson, LabMD Argues ‘Matter of Principle’ in FTC Data- Security
Appeal, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS (IAAP) (June 26, 2017),
https://iapp.org/news/a/11th-circuit-hears-arguments-in-labmd-v-ftc-appeal/ [https://perma.cc
/GVA4-FBV5]; Lesley Fair, Third Circuit Rules in FTC v Wyndham Case, FED. TRADE
COMM’N
(Aug.
25,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog
/2015/08/third-circuit-rules-ftc-v-wyndham-case [https://perma.cc/F9XR-9MTG].
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the boundaries of surveillance for new technologies like cellphonetower interception devices and license plate reader technologies,
existing technologies like GPS trackers for cars, and even common
technologies like the smartphone.43
Unsurprisingly, this breadth and ambiguity has resulted in a body
of privacy law in the United States that is loosely grouped to
communally serve some conceptualization of privacy. Despite this
vague common purpose, most areas of privacy law in the U.S. are
siloed and developed organically from the bottom-up, rather than a
unified set of principles producing rules that flow from the top-down.
Not all frameworks deal with a full range of privacy problems. Some
target surveillance.44 Others target problems with data processing.45
Still others deal with the disclosure of private information.46 Holistic
frameworks that address the lifecycle of information are limited in
scope. And there is no requirement that these rules be consistent with
each other.
This balkanization of privacy law in the U.S. has made change an
atomized process. No one area has been able to serve as a perfect
model for another.47 Some pockets of privacy law seem strangely
ossified. The original privacy torts—intrusion upon seclusion,
disclosure of privacy facts, misappropriation of name or likeness, and
depicting another in a false light—have failed to develop much since
their inception.48 They are limited by the First Amendment and
specific harm requirements in addition to a general skepticism by
courts.49 Notwithstanding a chorus of voices in industry and civil
society begging for reform, the last time Congress seriously revisited
the U.S. electronic surveillance laws was in the mid-1980s. When the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act was passed in 1986,
computers were outrageously expensive and the computing practices
and business models that shaped the rules were quite different than
43. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484−85 (2014); United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012); Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880, 887 (6th Cir. 2016),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
44. See, e.g., Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The
Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 975, 977–78 (1999).
45. See, e.g., Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy & The First Amendment: An Opt-In
Approach to Data Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2014).
46. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 37, at 530–35.
47. See id. at 483 (explaining that the “vast and complex” nature of American privacy
law necessitates a “new taxonomy to address privacy violations for contemporary times”).
48. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1189–90 (2010).
49. Id. at 1901–02.
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they are now.50 Even the new data protection rules that have been
passed in the last forty years like the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (“GLBA”) follow the same general set of principles, the fair
information practices, or “FIPs.”51 These basic data rules have not
changed much since they were conceived in the 1970s.
This ossification has stuck privacy law into a pattern of
perpetuating its deficiencies. The persistent mistakes surrounding the
conceptualization of privacy seem most visible. Courts and lawmakers
keep defining privacy in narrow ways, such as secrecy, ignoring
privacy in social contexts and new potential misuses of privacy
information. For example, there are few rules that meaningfully
mitigate the disparate impact that surveillance and data practices can
have on vulnerable and minority communities.52 Privacy law is often
treated as separate from anti-competition law.53 It is too often silent
on how technologies are used to manipulate people in subtle and
adversarial ways, or how companies employ powerful algorithms in
opaque ways with little accountability.54
Courts and lawmakers in privacy disputes cling to binary maxims
like “no privacy in public” or “no privacy in information shared with
third parties” instead of engaging with more nuanced notions of
privacy that require difficult balances with speech, security, and

50. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510−2522 (2016)); Rainey Reitman, Deep
Dive: Updating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/deep-dive-updating-electronic-communications
-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/988Y-XV2X]; Brad Smith, Modern Digital Data Laws That
Balance Law Enforcement Needs With Privacy Can Create A Model For The World,
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/06/15/modern-digital-dataMICROSOFT,
laws-balance-law-enforcement-needs-privacy-can-create-model-world/#sm
.00008opdpuw5pfn9scn1oi8nnyy98 [https://perma.cc/2WJF-22FX].
51. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.); Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 16
U.S.C.); Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76
MD. L. REV. 952, 953−54 (2017).
52. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 671, 677 (2016); Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV.
785, 785 (2015); Andrew P. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV.
109, 115–16 (2017).
53. See MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA & COMPETITION
POLICY 55 (2016).
54. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 19−20, 103 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008).
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autonomy, and often unsatisfying compromises and line-drawing
exercises.55 Bright-line rules like the “third-party doctrine” are
justiciable and easy to work with, but as I will discuss in Part II, they
are too often under inclusive of privacy interests. Sometimes privacy
harms are individually small but widely dispersed, like subtle forms of
manipulation using personal information to target your weak points
or the collective loss of massive data breaches.
In short, privacy law seems stuck. It is still grappling with old
problems even as new ones are on the way. Inertia might explain
some of this state of affairs. It is hard to change entrenched systems.
It is even harder, and often unwise, to propose something entirely
new. Established rules can reflect custom, wisdom, and feasibility.
However, body cameras provide a unique opportunity to create at
least a workable model for change. This technology implicates a
broad spectrum of privacy threats along the entirety of the
information lifecycle and requires a framework that addresses them
all, from surveillance and data collection to data storage and use to
data access and dissemination. Body cameras implicate problems that
are addressed in electronic surveillance law, data and consumer
protection law, public records rules, and free expression doctrine.
Because police body-camera rules can be created locally, they can
develop in an organic and stable way through dispersed
experimentation and revision.
1. Surveillance
The primary function of policy body cameras is surveillance.
danah boyd and Alex Rosenblat wrote, “[s]urveillance has an
economic and social price. Advocates [of body cameras] hope that the
psychological cost of being watched will dissuade officers from abuse,
but members of these communities will face these costs too.”56 They
noted that “[p]olice-worn body cams do not face the police. They face
members of the community—everyday people doing everyday things.
The goal may be to capture criminal activities by civilians and by
police, but to get there, these cameras will film people walking down
the street minding their business.”57 Body cameras can capture people
at their most vulnerable. They can also reveal things through
persistent surveillance that people do not anticipate, even in public.
Even the mere knowledge of surveillance can result in chilling effects

55. See infra Section II.B.
56. boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8.
57. Id.
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and harms to autonomy.58 The dangers of surveillance have been long
studied and articulated by scholars.59 The worst burden of
surveillance will be felt by the most vulnerable and underrepresented
communities.60
In addition to the specific surveillance harms against individuals,
the push for body cameras represents an even more ominous threat of
the slow but persistent creep to expand surveillance systems into all
areas of our life. Once these systems are built, it is incredibly difficult
to curtail and mitigate their influence over us. The mere existence of
cameras will increase their demand. For example, in the aftermath of
the police shooting of Justine Damond at her home in Minnesota,
many publicly asked why the officers’ body cameras had not been
activated.61 The mere presence of cameras will likely lead to questions
like “if you have the cameras, why don’t you use them?”62 The
absence of footage could be seen as evidence of wrongdoing,63 even if
that presumption is not justified. The result is a one-way ratchet that
will steadily demand and facilitate more surveillance in the absence of
clear, justified, and feasible rules that limit when a camera is to be on
capturing video and audio.
2. Data Protection
Body cameras also implicate the concerns about how
organizations collect, store, use, and share personal data. Elizabeth
58. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935,
1945 (2013).
59. Id. at 1934–36. See generally GARY T. MARX, WINDOWS INTO THE SOUL:
SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY (2016) (addressing
concerns such as the abuse of surveillance by “offering a framework that more
systematically defines surveillance questions with respect to structure, organization,
practice, function, and process” (footnote omitted)).
60. boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8 (“Those who will be surveilled by body-worn
cameras are already the most marginalized members of society, and they already
experience a disproportionate amount of surveillance from other law-enforcement
cameras. This is particularly true for people who lack private residences to retreat to,
either because they are homeless or are resident[s] in public housing, where the police
have greater freedom to enter over a resident’s objection.”).
61. Gordon Severson, Expert: Body Cameras Should Have Recorded Australian
Woman’s Shooting, USA TODAY (July 19, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation-now/2017/07/19/body-cameras-should-have-recorded-justine-damond-shooting/491064001/
[https://perma.cc/5CS6-6LGV].
62. Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 15, at 842 (“As police cameras become
more pervasive, it becomes impossible to escape demands—from courts, litigants, juries,
citizens, the media, and civilian review boards—that cameras always will be used, that
video always will be available.”).
63. Id. (stating that people will demand the use of body cameras and “the absence of
video evidence is itself suspicious and suggestive of misconduct”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 1257 (2018)

2018]

BODY CAMERAS & PRIVACY LAW

1273

Joh wrote that the data generated by body cameras present just as
much of a challenge as their surveillance capabilities.64 She argues,
“Police body camera policies must address not only concerns about
surveillance, but also data control. The absence of clear data control
policies will result in confusion, both for the police and the public,
about who has access to see, share, and delete data produced from
body-worn cameras.”65 According to Joh, “without strong
presumptions in favor of sharing the data with the public, the reform,
accountability, and legitimacy potential of body worn cameras will go
unfulfilled.”66 However, making data public in a safe and sustainable
way is challenging.
Data harms are wide-ranging and pervasive.67 Personal
information can reveal secrets and confidences, but it can also be
misused against the data subject and others. Our data reveals what
makes us tick and can be used to manipulate us. For example, Ryan
Calo has observed that personal information can be leveraged for the
“mass production of bias,” “disclosure ratcheting,” and “means-based
targeting.”68 He calls this a kind of “digital market manipulation.”69
Personal data also presents systemic threats. Data powers
automated technology and machine learning. It is used to power
decision-making algorithms that can reinforce human biases70 and
have disparate impacts on minority and vulnerable populations. In
previous research, I have written that “[d]ecisions that used to be
made by humans based upon a small amount of information are now
going to be made by automated software based upon exabytes of
data.”71 Danielle Citron has said that computers are increasingly the
primary decision-makers in systems that have significant
consequences for humans.72 Automated decision-making systems now
leverage personal data when terminating “individuals’ Medicaid, food
64. Joh, supra note 3, at 133.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1133 (2011)
(categorizing the wide range of date harms into objective and subjective).
68. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1007, 1012,
1015 (2014).
69. Id. at 1051.
70. Hartzog, supra note 51, at 971.
71. Id. at 970. An exabyte is 1 billion gigabytes. See Daniel Price, Surprising Facts and
Stats About the Big Data Industry, CLOUDTWEAKS (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://cloudtweaks.com/2015/03/surprising-facts-and-stats-about-the-big-data-industry/
[https://perma.cc/5EC3-J8WM].
72. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1252 (2008).
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stamp, and other welfare benefits,”73 as well as excluding people from
air travel.74 Citron observed that “[c]omputer programs identify
parents believed to owe child support and instruct state agencies to
file collection proceedings against those individuals. Voters are
purged from the rolls without notice, and small businesses are
deemed ineligible for federal contracts.”75 Therefore, data collection
and processing implicates serious due process issues,76 disparate
impact on minority and other vulnerable communities,77 and invasions
of privacy and stigmatization due to the predictive power of data
analytics.78
Further, soon it might not even be possible to opt out of
automated decision-making. Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale
have warned that we are at risk of becoming what they call a “scored
society,” whereby people are assigned numbers similar to credit
scores, but for everything.79 Industry is also working to deploy
algorithmic decision making to rank, file, and sort us in nearly every
way imaginable, including many that people have yet to realize.80 Our
subjugation to algorithms has already started. China aims to “give
every citizen a score based on behavior such as spending habits,
turnstile violations[,] and filial piety, which can blacklist citizens from
loans, jobs, [and] air travel.”81 The sustainability, safety, and efficacy

73. Id. at 1252, 1256, 1268–73 (discussing the issuance of hundreds of thousands of
incorrect Medicaid, food stamp, and welfare eligibility determinations across numerous
state programs as an example of a failed automated system).
74. Id. at 1252, 1274–75 (discussing erroneous classifications, in which innocent
individuals are mistakenly identified as terrorists, on the “No Fly” list).
75. Id.
76. See generally id. (discussing the threat data collection and processing, specifically
in the context of automated systems, poses to due process).
77. See generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 52 (positing that data mining can
perpetuate discriminatory behavior, often by picking out proxy variables for protected
classes).
78. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 81, 83–85 (2013); Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption:
How Big Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 71–72 (2013),
https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/08/66_StanLRevOnline_65
_KerrEarle.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAC6-66M4].
79. Danielle K. Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 8 (2014); see also PASQUALE, supra note
54, at 191–92 (2015); Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2014) (identifying discrimination as an additional concern
related to the emergence of a scored society).
80. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 79, at 3–4, 8 (citing the secrecy of the scoring
systems and metrics as a major criticism to the emergence of a scored society).
81. Josh Chin & Gillian Wong, China’s New Tool for Social Control: A Credit Rating
ST.
J.
(Nov.
28,
2016,
11:46
AM),
for
Everything,
WALL
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of these systems depends upon whether we have rules for how they
are built and used.82
Kate Crawford and Ryan Calo have argued that “[a]utonomous
systems are already deployed in our most crucial social institutions,
from hospitals to courtrooms. Yet there are no agreed methods to
assess the sustained effects of such applications on human
populations.”83 Body cameras are a great opportunity to create rules
that understand how data and automation will impact people, culture,
and politics, because these technologies will likely seek to leverage
algorithms and automated decision-making, yet their rules and
policies remain nimble and dispersed. There is room for
experimenting with rules without disrupting the whole.84
3. Public Records and Public Disclosure
Finally, body cameras raise incredibly important questions about
what constitutes a public record, who gets to access those records and
under what circumstances, how they access them, and what can be
done with them upon disclosure.85 Public records laws are critical for
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-new-tool-for-social-control-a-credit-rating-foreverything-1480351590 [https://perma.cc/JX77-MNBG (dark archive)].
82. Hartzog, supra note 51, at 971.
83. Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research, 538 NATURE
311, 311 (2016).
84. For more on the important role that states play with algorithmic accountability,
see Julia Powles, New York City’s Bold, Flawed Attempt to Make Algorithms Accountable,
NEW YORKER (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/new-york-citysbold-flawed-attempt-to-make-algorithms-accountable
[https://perma.cc/HNL4-8U4C]
(discussing legislation in New York to create a task force that will examine the state’s
automated decision systems).
85. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy
Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 435–36 (2016) (arguing for safe harbor laws that encourage
automated redaction of records and incentivize the development of redaction technology);
Brian Liebman, Recent Development, The Watchman Blinded: Does the North Carolina
Public Records Law Frustrate the Purpose of Police Body Cameras?, 94 N.C. L. REV. 344,
348 (2015) (arguing that “unless the public records law is changed to allow the public,
rather than the police, to decide when footage of potential police misconduct should be
released, the beneficial effects of body cameras will be frustrated.”); Richard Lin, Note,
Police Body Worn Cameras and Privacy: Retaining Benefits While Reducing Public
Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 346, 365 (2016) (suggesting “shortening data
retention policies, tagging videos, and using redaction technology” to balance privacy and
disclosure concerns with evidentiary and accountability benefits of body cameras); Chris
Pagliarella, Comment, Police Body-Worn Camera Footage: A Question of Access, 34
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 533, 534 (2016) (“BWC programs must provide full footage access
to the victims of suspected undue police violence and their families—allowing for an
accountability baseline and setting victims’ rights as paramount. Public record policies
should not impede this core goal by imposing public access where the associated costs
could stymie such programs altogether.” (emphasis in original)); Joseph Wenner,
Comment, Who Watches the Watchmen’s Tape? FOIA’s Categorical Exemptions and
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government accountability and journalism in the public interest.
Generally, public records laws dictate the type of records created or
stored by government entities that will be made available to anyone
that requests them and the circumstances under which they will be
released or withheld.86 But the concept of public records also has
blurry edges. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a public record as “[a]
record that a governmental unit is required by law to keep.”87 One of
the central questions in the law of public records concerns which
public records should be ultimately released—and which should not—
based on certain policy considerations, including privacy.88
Two major privacy issues related to public records arise when
they are aggregated into massive datasets that dramatically reduce the
search costs for the curious and when they include information that is
already “public” or involves “public surveillance.”89 First, people’s
names, ages, addresses, and similar regularly disclosed information
might not be seen as “private” in the traditional sense of the word but
can still be used in adverse ways against them.90 Courts and
lawmakers regularly consider much of this information to be public
and thus not subject to a public records privacy exemption, perhaps
because we expose and share this information with others all the time.
The same holds true for the release of surveillance that occurred “in
public.” There is a litany of cases that hold surveillance in public
spaces and in “plain view” does not infringe a reasonable expectation
Police Body-Worn Cameras, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 873, 876 (arguing that “examining the
applicability of exemptions to body-worn camera videos on a case-by-case basis
strengthens their transparency benefits without unduly eroding personal privacy or the
integrity of ongoing investigations.”).
86. See generally ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT IN THE COMPUTER AGE: AN
EXAMINATION OF STATE PUBLIC RECORDS LAWS (Martha Harrell Chumbler ed., 2007)
(discussing the public records laws of several states and the federal government).
87. Public Record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
88. See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical
Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1807, 1813 (2015); Grayson Barber, Personal
Information in Government Records: Protecting the Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 63 (2006); Amanda Conley et. al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice
in the Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV.
772, 774 (2012); Jane E. Kirtley, “Misguided in Principle and Unworkable in Practice”: It Is
Time to Discard the Reporters Committee Doctrine of Practical Obscurity (and Its Evil
Twin, the Right to Be Forgotten), 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91, 109 (2015); Samuel A. Terilli &
Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-Scene Photographs: Relational
Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 313, 322 (2005).
89. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1138; see also Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 88, at
1807–08; Conley et. al., supra note 88, at 777 (“[C]ourts have an obligation to rewrite rules
governing the creation of, and access to, public court records in light of substantive
changes that online access augurs.”).
90. See Solove, supra note 14, at 1138.
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of privacy.91 Second, another concern with such a dramatic increase in
public records is the great potential and incentives for companies to
exploit data for their own personal gain, rather than for public
accountability purposes.92 Will body-camera vendors be able to sell or
export the data it captures and stores?93 Or might this data somehow
end up in the hands of unscrupulous businesses that post
embarrassing information about people gleaned from public records,
like mugshots, then charge a high fee to have that information taken
down?94
Police body-camera rules should grapple with the privacy
implications of exabytes95 of surveillance data being made available as
public records. Many of them already do. But questions remain.
When should data be deleted? In what format should footage be
made available and how soon? Should police-body camera footage
and data be somehow redacted or obfuscated? Should access be
granted only subject to certain restrictions on further use or
dissemination? Public records laws have existed for a long time.
Lawmakers do not often have the occasion or impetus to wholesale
91. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–137 (1990); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)
(“The Fourth Amendment simply does not require police traveling in the public airways at
1,000 feet to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”
(footnote omitted)); United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 242 (4th Cir. 1994); Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964) (noting that there was no
expectation of privacy at a fair but permitting a tort suit by a woman who was
photographed at a county fair with her skirt blown up over her head, relying in part on the
fact that the photographer was lying in wait to catch the woman in an embarrassing
situation); Creel v. I.C.E. & Assocs., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 1276, 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002);
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in A Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 1, 6, 18 (2007) (“Courts have generally held that anything capable of being viewed
from a ‘public place’ does not fall within the privacy torts’ protective umbrella. . . . Under
the Restatement, an individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any
public place. More formally, any activity that is visible to the public eye—whether that eye
is human or mechanical—is not actionable under the public disclosure tort. For example,
courts have found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a restaurant, in a
church service, or at a county fair.”) (footnotes omitted)).
92. See Margaret B. Kwoka, Inside FOIA, Inc., 126 YALE L.J. F. 265, 266 (2016);
Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1361, 1377 (2016) [hereinafter
Kwoka, FOIA, Inc.].
93. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 959 (2004); Solove, supra note 14, at 1138.
94. See, e.g., David Segal, Mugged by a Mugshot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html [https://perma.cc
/ZX5J-GQA7 (dark archive)].
95. “A unit of information equal to one quintillion (1018) or, strictly, 260 bytes.”
Exabyte, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
exabyte [https://perma.cc/K3TD-T7HS].
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reimagine a public records framework that better balances
government transparency and accountability with more nuanced
conceptualizations of privacy. But body cameras are just such an
opportunity.
* * *
Because body-camera systems leverage sensors, algorithms, and
data in ways that implicate privacy, government transparency, and
free speech, they are an opportunity to modify surveillance, data, and
public records rules all at once and stake out new ground at the
municipal and state levels. This kind of ground-up federalism has the
benefit of flexibility and more stable foundation over time. For
example, Paul Schwartz has argued that states can be “laboratories
for innovations in information privacy law.”96 Regarding drones—
another surveillance technology that necessitates new rules—Margot
Kaminski has written that the tension between privacy and First
Amendment freedom is better resolved by the states than an attempt
by the federal government to resolve the tension in “one fell
swoop.”97 According to Kaminski, federal legislation is expensive,
burdensome to enact, and more likely to be overturned by courts. She
argues, “[r]ather than attempt to get federal legislation right on the
first try, and risk having it rejected by First-Amendment-protective
courts, we should allow states to run through less costly iterations.”98
Kaminski’s argument resonates with body cameras as well.
Given the state’s interest and providence regarding policing,
body-camera law is less likely to be preempted by federal legislation
than privacy rules for drones, which have caught the attention of
federal regulators like the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”).99 Cities and states have an increasingly important role to
play in privacy law. Body-camera law is a good example of what Ira
Rubinstein calls “privacy localism,” a focus on municipal and state
privacy rules. Rubinstein argues that privacy localism is important
because “privacy issues are highly salient to cities” in light of big data
policing and the “smart city” movement, that cities have significant
flexibility to create privacy rules due to the lack of privacy legislation
at the state and federal level, and cities have historically been more
willing than state governments or the federal government to try out
96. Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 916 (2009).
97. Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They
Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 64 (2013).
98. Id.
99. Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/ [https://perma.cc/J9JK-99UN].
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innovative new privacy protections.100 This Article echoes
Rubinstein’s calls for privacy localism, particularly with respect to
body-worn cameras.
To meaningfully address the faults of privacy law, lawmakers and
courts must act quickly. Cities and states are already passing or
considering legislation. Policies are already getting adopted and the
cameras, systems, and storage software are already being built. But if
law and policy makers seize the moment and explicitly move beyond
traditional notions of the data protection and the fatally flawed
“reasonable expectations of privacy” test, they can start a revolution.
II. REFINING THEORY: GET RID OF THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY TEST
Lawmakers and courts should not rely on the concept of a
“reasonable expectation of privacy” as a threshold for body camera
privacy rules. This concept is entrenched, so it is easy to see why
lawmakers might look to it when crafting rules for body cameras. It
determines the scope of protections under the Fourth Amendment
and other aspects of privacy law, including the privacy torts,
surveillance statutes, and public records law.101 The test for
determining the boundaries of surveillance and data practices was
popularized in the influential case of Katz v. United States.102
Ostensibly, in order to determine whether surveillance or data
practices are allowable, courts and lawmakers are to ask whether an
individual has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and also
whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.103 In
theory, this test fits alongside the longstanding tradition of

100. Ira Rubinstein, Privacy Localism 6–7 (N.Y.U. Sch. Of L., Working Paper No. 1818, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3124697 [https://perma.cc
/V7NF-TVBM].
101. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967); see also Solove, supra
note 18, at 1512–13.
102. 389 U.S. at 353.
103. See id. at 352 (stating that Katz, seeking to exclude the uninvited ear, is entitled to
assume that his conversation will be private when he enters the telephone booth). But see
Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 113, 114 (2015) (“This Essay argues that Katz is only a one-step test.
Subjective expectations are irrelevant. A majority of courts that apply Katz do not even
mention the subjective inquiry; when it is mentioned, it is usually not applied; and when it
is applied, it makes no difference to outcomes.”).
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“reasonableness” thresholds within the law.104 In practice it has not
worked out that well.
This test has far outlived its usefulness. The concept of privacy is
far too vague and difficult to define for it to be deployed as a term of
art. Additionally, the reasonableness test too often defaults into
descriptive accounts of both people and society’s actual expectations
of secrecy, rather than normative accounts of which personal
boundaries should be protected.105
So far, several cities and states have already made the mistake of
relying upon reasonable expectations of privacy for body-camera
rules. According to research conducted by The Leadership
Conference & Upturn, as of August 2016, of the major cities they
studied that have enacted body-camera policies, many either prohibit
or mitigate recording or regulate data use and access in contexts
where individuals have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”106 For
example, in Philadelphia police body cameras cannot be used or
activated “[i]n places where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists

104. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness in and out of Negligence Law, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 2131, 2146 (2015) (surveying the various uses of “reasonableness” in the law
and noting that it is the standard for Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases).
105. See Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 139, 149 (2016).
106. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN,
supra note 7. Boston uses the concept of “reasonable expectation of privacy” to limit
officers’ discretion when choosing to record but then provides a longer list of
considerations for officers in privacy-sensitive contexts without actually deploying the
specific language and concept of “reasonable expectations”:
BWC officers should be mindful of locations where recording may be considered
insensitive, inappropriate, or may be prohibited by privacy policies. Such locations
may include locker rooms, places of worship, religious ceremonies, certain
locations in hospitals or clinics, law offices, day care facilities, etc. At such
locations, at the officer’s discretion and based on the circumstances, BWCs may be
turned off. The officer may consider the option to divert the BWC away from any
subjects and record only audio, if appropriate. When exercising discretion in such
situations, the decision whether to stop recording, divert the BWC, or record only
audio should generally be based on the following BWC Discretionary Recording
Considerations: the extent to which the officer observes activities or circumstances
of a sensitive or private nature; the presence of individuals who are not the subject
of the officer-civilian interaction; the presence of people who appear to be minors;
any request by a civilian to stop recording; and the extent to which absence of
BWC recording will affect the investigation.
BOS. POLICE DEP’T, POLICE COMM’R’S SPECIAL ORDER NO. 16-023: BODY-WORN
CAMERA PILOT PROGRAM POLICY § 2.4 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/5086f19ce4b0ad16ff15598d/t/57a0d592725e25a1855d9143/1470158226345/Body_Camera.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQ7D-TUQT].
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(i.e., locker rooms, dressing rooms or restrooms).”107 Sometimes these
policies employ the “reasonable expectations” language as a “catch
all” provision in combination with other, more specific rules that
dictate when the body camera should not be used.108 Other times, the
“reasonable expectations” language is used to determine when
officers should exercise discretion when recording; when surveillance
subjects should be notified that they are being recorded; and, in some
cities, when surveillance subjects will be given the option to request
the camera be turned off.109
A number of body-camera policies even permit the officer to
record in certain circumstances where there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Atlanta has rules that state law enforcement
officers may use body-worn cameras to “record the activities that
107. PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.21: BODY-WORN CAMERAS § 4-C (2017),
http://www.phillypolice.com/assets/directives/D4.21-BodyWornCameras.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7UX7-XWVG].
108. See, e.g., CLEVELAND DIV. OF POLICE, GEN. POLICE ORDER NO. 3.2.20:
WEARABLE CAMERA SYSTEM (WCS) § V (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/oh
_clevelandpd_wcs_policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NCU-U9YK]. Cleveland’s policy states
that, unless otherwise required, the camera shall not be used to capture the following:
D. Protected health information and treatment when requested by the patient, or
on-scene Emergency Medical Service or Division of Fire personnel.
E. Gratuitous captured media (i.e. effects of extreme violence or injury, exposed
genitalia or other erogenous areas, etc.).
F. Any place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (i.e. dressing
rooms, restrooms, etc.).
G. Images of confidential informants or undercover members, unless requested by
the undercover member, their supervisor, or commanding member.
H. Conversations of citizens and/or members (i.e. administrative duties, court,
community meetings, etc.).
Id. at § V(D)–(H).
109. See, e.g., CITY OF FERGUSON, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, GEN. ORDER
NO. 481.00, § 481.3(3) (2016), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2016-02-26
%20Ferguson%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AD43-LS4C]
(“In
exercising this discretion, officers should be aware of and sensitive to civilians’ reasonable
privacy expectations.”); FAIRFAX CTY. POLICE DEP’T, DRAFT MODEL POLICY FOR
BODY WORN CAMERA § IX (2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/2016/policies
/2015-05-17%20Fairfax%20County%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6B5BAWQ] (“When officers are recording persons in locations where the person should have
a reasonable expectation of privacy (i.e. home, business office not open to the public,
restroom, locker room, etc.), the officer should whenever practical . . . inform the
person(s) that they are being recorded.”); MIAMI-DADE POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE NO.
16-18, REVISION TO THE DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL, NEW POLICY: CHAPTER 33 - PART 1
- BODY-WORN CAMERA SYSTEM § VII(H) (2016), https://www.miamidade.gov/police
/library/bwc-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/D423-E7NZ] (“In locations where victims have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, such as a residence, hospital, or place of worship, an
officer may honor a victim’s request to turn off the BWC unless the recording is being
made pursuant to an arrest or search of the residence or the individuals.”).
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occur in places where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy if
they occur in the presence of the law enforcement officer.”110 However,
Atlanta’s body-camera policy protects the privacy of recorded
individuals by exempting recordings “used by law enforcement in
places where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy from
disclosure” under the Georgia Open Records Act.111 Aurora,
Colorado, provides that “[t]he body-worn camera will not be
activated in public places where a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists, such as locker rooms, changing rooms, or restrooms unless the
activation is for the purpose of official law enforcement activity.”112
Dallas follows the trend of privacy law in refusing to recognize any
privacy in “public,” as its policy states: “Officers are not required to
obtain consent from a private person when in a public place or in a
location where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.”113
110. ATLANTA POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL: STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURE NO. 3133, BODY WORN CAMERAS (BWC) § 4.3.1 (2017),
http://www.atlantapd.org/Home/ShowDocument?id=954 [https://perma.cc/6KYJ-QS6G].
However, the policy does prohibit recording in dressing rooms, locker rooms and
restrooms, as well as “exposed genitals or other sexually sensitive areas.” Id. at § 4.4.1.
111. Id. at § 4.9.1.
112. AURORA POLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVES MANUAL § 16.4.4 (rev. 2017),
https://www.auroragov.org/common/pages/DisplayFile.aspx?itemId=10473413 [https://perma.cc
/BK6S-9J9L]. Chicago’s policy states that “[t]he BWC will not be used to record . . . in
locations where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, such as dressing rooms or
restrooms, unless required for capturing evidence.” CHI. POLICE DEP’T, SPECIAL ORDER
S03-14 § V.H (2016) (emphasis added), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives
/data/a7a57b38-151f3872-56415-1f38-89ce6c22d026d090.pdf?ownapi=1
[https://perma.cc
/2TCF-SWAE]; see also CINCINNATI POLICE DEP’T, PROCEDURE MANUAL,
PROCEDURE NO. 12.540 BODY WORN CAMERA SYSTEM § A.5.c (2017),
https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/assets/File/Procedures/12540.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/Y8ZZ-NPSY] (“Officers will not use the BWC to record the following . . . [i]n any place
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., restroom, locker room) except
during an active incident (e.g., foot pursuit that leads into a locker room)”); DENVER
POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL § 119.04(3)(b)(4) (2018), https://www.denvergov.org
/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/720/documents/OperationsManual/OMSBook/OM_Book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XV77-2HGG] (“The BWC will not be activated in places where a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists (such as detox, medical, and/or healthcare
facilities, locker rooms or restrooms, etc.) unless the activation is for the purpose of
official law enforcement activity.”); MEMPHIS POLICE DEP’T, POLICY AND PROCEDURE
INFORMATION AND UPDATES § V.C. (2016), http://www.memphispolice.org/pdf/BWC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZQZ6-QYTC] (“The [BWC] will not be activated in places where a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, such as locker rooms or restrooms, unless the
activation is for the purpose of official law enforcement activity such as a call for service.
When possible, every precaution shall be taken to respect the dignity of the victim by
avoiding recording videos of persons who are nude or when sensitive areas are exposed. If
this is unavoidable, the video can later be redacted.”).
113. DALLAS POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 332.00 BODY WORN CAMERAS
§ 332.04(A)(4) (2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2015-08-31%20Dallas
%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQC9-8UYW]. This policy also provides:

96 N.C. L. REV. 1257 (2018)

2018]

BODY CAMERAS & PRIVACY LAW

1283

The states that have proposed or enacted legislation around body
cameras use the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
similar way. The statute in Illinois requires notice of surveillance be
given in contexts where people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.114 In determining whether to release video footage, Missouri
requires courts consider “[w]hether . . . video . . . contains information
. . . reasonably likely to disclose private matters in which the public
has no legitimate concern; bring shame or humiliation to a person . . . ;
was taken in place where a person . . . has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”115 Louisiana’s law prohibits the release of body-camera data
that violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.116
In this Part, I will join the chorus of scholars that argue that the
reasonable expectation of privacy test is broken and unsalvageable. I
argue in favor of rules that favor more specific privacy-related values
such as trust, obscurity, and autonomy, with an emphasis on process,
relationships, and risk.
A. The Test is Broken and Unsalvageable
The problem with the reasonable expectations of privacy test is
that it is too vague and too descriptive. Scholars have long protested
the reasonable expectations text.117 Daniel Solove wrote, “The

While in public areas, officers are not required to advise a subject that they are
recording their interaction unless the subject specifically asks if they are being
recorded, at which point the officer will inform the subject that they are being
recorded. When in a private residence in an official capacity, officers are not
required to advise the resident they are recording. The officer is not prohibited
from but encouraged to advise the citizen of the recording if doing so if it would
better serve the handling of the incident.
Id. at § 332.04(A)(5)–(6).
114. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 706/10-20(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.).
115. MO. REV. STAT. § 610.100(5)(3)(b)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 First Reg.
Sess. and First and Second Extraordinary Sessions of the 99th Gen. Assembly).
116. LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:3(A)(8) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Second Extraordinary
Sess.)).
117. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002); Solove, supra
note 18, at 1511–12 (citing Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
“Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1321 (1981)); Richard G.
Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An Emerging Tripartite
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1987). But see Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of
Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2007) (“Scholars and
students of Fourth Amendment law find the current approach frustrating because the
courts routinely mix and match the four models . . . . But appearances can be deceiving.
What at first looks like conceptual confusion turns out to be a much-needed range of
approaches.”).
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reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a contentious
jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence.
Debates rage over whether particular government information
gathering activities invade ‘privacy.’”118 He was not always a critic.
Solove wrote, “For a long time, I believed that with the appropriate
understanding of privacy—one that is well-adapted to modern
technology,
nimble
and
nuanced,
forward-looking
and
sophisticated—Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could be
rehabilitated. I now realize I was wrong.”119 According to Solove, the
focus on reasonable expectations of privacy is misguided with respect
to the Fourth Amendment. A focus on privacy invasions often is only
tenuously related to problems caused by government surveillance and
investigation. Solove argues that a focus on privacy “also bears little
relation to whether it is best to have judicial oversight of law
enforcement activity, what that oversight should consist of, how much
limitation we want to impose on various government information
gathering activities, and how we should guard against abuses of
power.”120 Other critics have labeled the law surrounding the Fourth
Amendment as “confusing, illogical, chaotic, and inconsistent.”121
The reasonable expectations test is also too often just a proxy for
identifying people or society’s subjective expectations instead of rules
for mitigating surveillance and data practices as exercises of power.122
Pre-existing perceptions of exposure can be used to justify invasive
surveillance practices. Scholars have noted that there is not enough of

118. Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65
IND. L. J. 549, 554–55 (1990) (“[W]e should return to the privacy test intended by
[Justices] Stewart and Harlan and to the underlying values that motivated it.”); Brian J.
Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model of Fourth Amendment Protection, 73
MINN. L. REV. 583, 642 (1989) (“[T]he Court’s current [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis is
based on simplistic and logically incorrect theories of public exposure.”); Solove, supra
note 18, at 1511–12.
119. Solove, supra note 18, at 1512.
120. Id. at 1513.
121. See Tokson, supra note 105, at 144 (citing Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg,
The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149–50 (1998); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth
Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1321
(1981); and Donald R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s
Public/Private Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1191, 1208
(1985)).
122. See Solove, supra note 18, at 1521 (“From the way it is formulated, the test
purports to be an empirical metric of societal views on privacy.”); cf. Tokson, supra note
105, at 144 (noting that the Fourth Amendment test is “well-defined”). But see Matthew
B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1747 (2017) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment test is not circular).
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a moral floor for the privacy test.123 Solove wrote that it is not
people’s expectations that should matter, but rather what they desire
regardless of their expectations. He wrote, “We look to the law not
just to preserve the status quo, but to change it and to shape society
into what we want it to be.”124 Mathew Tokson proposed looking
exclusively to positive law or having courts engaging in direct
normative balancing as an alternative to relying upon expectations
that might not contain an ethical infrastructure.125 The lack of moral
floor allows unchallenged privacy encroachments to serve as the
justification that people can no longer expect privacy. Even worse, it
ignores the need for rules even when surveillance and data practices
might not threaten certain conceptualizations of privacy, such as
secrecy.126
I agree with the critics, perhaps for slightly different reasons than
some. While many find fault in the application of the test, my critique
lies with the fatal inclusion of the concept of privacy within the text
itself. What is “privacy,” anyway? It has no set meaning, which
creates real problems. Since no one knows what privacy really means,
any rules that are built around the malleable general concept of
privacy, instead of more specific concepts like confidentiality, secrecy,
or obscurity, are destined to be ill-fitting and exploited. When courts
and lawmakers allow privacy to be subject to definition at every turn,

123. See Solove, supra note 18, at 1524 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974)) (noting that Supreme Court
pronouncements themselves affect society’s future expectations of privacy and that “the
government could condition the populace into expecting less privacy. For example, as
Professor Anthony Amsterdam has observed, the government could diminish expectations
of privacy by announcing on television each night that we could all be subject to electronic
surveillance.”).
124. Id.
125. Tokson explains that under a positive law regime, the “absence of a law or
common law tort prohibiting some government information-gathering activity would
definitively establish that the activity was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. The
reverse would also apply—when a government investigative action violated positive law, it
would constitute a per se Fourth Amendment search.” Tokson, supra note 105, at 190
(footnote omitted). Alternatively, “[a] direct normative balancing test would find a Fourth
Amendment search when the harms to citizens of allowing police to engage in a certain
type of surveillance without a warrant outweigh the benefits to society via improved law
enforcement.” Id. at 196.
126. Solove, supra note 18, at 1525 (“But even measuring desires fails to address an
overarching problem: we might want to regulate government information gathering even
when it does not violate privacy. The problem with a doctrinal test based on privacy is that
it ensnares courts and commentators into a debate over the meaning of privacy and takes
the focus away from the full range of problems the Fourth Amendment needs to address.
Practical consequences are ignored in an analytic approach that is nearly blind to the
results.”).
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those seeking to surveil and collect data will consistently argue for the
most narrow interpretation possible. Without a more specific value or
goal to guide how privacy should be conceptualized, they will win. It
is time to get rid of the reasonable expectations test throughout
privacy law, and police body cameras are an ideal place to chart more
protective, accurate, and sustainable benchmarks.
B.

Embrace More Specific Notions of Privacy

Every time law and policy makers invoke the concept of privacy
to define people’s expectations or obligations, they should clarify
what they mean by that word. Privacy can be conceptualized many
different ways.127 How it is conceptualized will dictate which values it
ultimately serves or ignores. For example, if privacy is conceptualized
only as secrecy, information shared with groups of people will be
excluded, and the values of trust and obscurity will not be served.
Prioritizing values can help determine how the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is administered with respect to body
cameras. For example, if privacy rules are meant to facilitate the
value of intimacy, then prohibitions on filming nude people or in
people’s bedrooms make sense and might be sufficient. If privacy
rules are meant to facilitate solitude, then privacy rules might be
interpreted in similar ways to prevent filming when people thought
they were isolated. But intimacy and solitude are not the only ways to
conceptualize privacy. Data-protection regimes and identity rights
seek to protect privacy by providing people control over their
personal information and preserving their dignity. Rules of evidence
and fiduciary responsibility seem to advance privacy interests by
preserving confidentiality. When the concept of “privacy” is used in
law without any meaningful clarification, courts and lawmakers have
no clear guidance on which conceptualization to use and which
privacy values to prioritize.
Too often, the reasonable expectation of privacy test merely acts
as a proxy for “expectation of secrecy.” There are, of course, good
reasons not to film in places where we expect near total secrecy,
seclusion, and discretion, such as bathrooms and dressing rooms. But
the problem is when the entirety of privacy is framed in this way.128
Consider Milwaukee’s body-camera policy, which states “[body worn127. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087
(2002) (evaluating different conceptions of privacy).
128. See DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 6 (2008); Daniel Solove, “I’ve
Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
745, 746 (2007); Solove, supra note 127, at 1089.
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cameras] will not be activated in a place where a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists, such as dressing rooms, locker rooms
and restrooms.”129 This policy frames privacy as secrecy—something
not known or seen or not meant to be known or seen by others.130 But
what about every other aspect of our lives? Can we only expect
privacy when we are naked?
The better approach to the reasonable expectations of privacy
test is to build rules that serve more specific values than the neargeneric conceptualization of privacy. Specifically, I recommend
relying upon the concepts of trust and obscurity to mitigate two of the
biggest weaknesses of the “reasonable expectations” test: the
misguided third-party doctrine and the fallacy that there is “no
privacy in public.”
1. Trust Protects Relationships
People place their trust in others every day. We should formulate
rules requiring recipients of information to be discreet, protective,
honest, and—most importantly—loyal. This is particularly true as an
ethos for third-party vendors of body cameras and the data they
create.
Professor Neil Richards and I have argued that modern privacy
law is incomplete because, from its inception, it has failed to account
for the importance of trust.131 We adopted the definition of trust as
the willingness to make one vulnerable to the actions of others, which
emphasizes the role of power within relationships.132
Trust is an essential component of healthy relationships and
healthy societies. Although different disciplines define trust in various

129. MILWAUKEE POLICE DEP’T., GEN. ORD. NO. 2015-42: STD. OP. PROC. 747—
BODY WORN CAMERAS (BWCS) § 747.25.E.1 (2015), https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam
_policies/WI/MilwaukeeWI_BWC_policy_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QVF-64F8].
130. Secret, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. 1993).
131. For a discussion of the importance of trust and its relation to privacy, see
generally ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE (forthcoming 2018); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s
Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog,
Privacy’s Trust Gap]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in
Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Trusting Big Data Research, 66
DEPAUL L. REV. 579 (2017) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Trusting Big Data
Research].
132. See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 131, at 1213;
Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 131, at 433.
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ways,133 it is useful to think of trust as a “state of mind that enables its
possessor to be willing to make herself vulnerable to another—that is,
to rely on another despite a positive risk that the other will act in a
way that can harm the truster.”134 Trust allows cooperation with other
people despite the fact that exposing ourselves enables them to harm
us. In the context of information relationships, trust means the
willingness to become vulnerable to a person or organization by
disclosing personal information.
Every disclosure of personal information in the modern age
leaves the discloser vulnerable in some way, if only incrementally. As
a result, every information relationship involves some degree of trust,
or willingness to become vulnerable.135 This is true even if that trust is
not a conscious one. Trust is a key component in the relationship
between citizens and police, particularly with respect to the data that
is created from body cameras. In cities and states where consent is
used to justify body-camera use, that consent is likely going to be
based on trust that the officer is going to protect what is recorded and
keep it from getting into the wrong hands or used in a way that
violates the people’s privacy.
So, how can privacy rules for body cameras further trust? One
way is to break the concept down into its component parts. Richards
and I articulate the various tenets of trust as discretion, honesty,
protection, and loyalty.136 We have argued that those who we entrust
with our information and well-being have “a duty to avoid
unreasonable and dangerous self-dealing.”137
These four concepts—discretion, honesty, protection, and
loyalty—can guide rules that support trust. They are not new. They
are foundations of one of the most established legal concepts
involving trust in relationships—the law of fiduciaries.138 The “central
goal of fiduciary law is to protect against the exploitation of a
vulnerability created by trust in another.”139 Jack Balkin has argued
133. See, e.g., Batya Friedman & Peter H. Kahn, Jr., Human Values, Ethics, and
Design, in THE HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION HANDBOOK: FUNDAMENTALS,
EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES AND EMERGING APPLICATIONS 1177, 1190 (Julie A. Jacko &
Andrew Sears eds., 2003) (“[T]rust is said to exist between people who can experience
good will, extend good will toward others, feel vulnerable, and experience betrayal.”
(citation omitted)).
134. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1717, 1724 (2006)
135. See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 131, at 431.
136. See, e.g., id. at 457.
137. Id.; see also Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap, supra note 131, at 1214.
138. See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 131, at 457.
139. Id. (citations omitted).
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that the notion of fiduciaries is a great fit for modern information
privacy problems, which arise within relationships that involve power
and information asymmetries and are characterized by the collection
or exchange of personal information.140
Certain body-camera policies already recognize the importance
of trust by seeking to protect confidential informants. For example,
Philadelphia’s body-camera policy states that “Body-Worn Cameras
shall not be used or activated to . . . [r]ecord conversations with
confidential informants and undercover officers.”141 Austin’s policy
does not require the activation of body cameras when “[a] potential
witness who requests to speak to an officer [asks for] confidential[ity]
or desires anonymity” or when “[a] victim or witness . . . requests that
he or she not be recorded as a condition of cooperation and the
interests of justice require such cooperation.”142 These kinds of
provisions require or permit confidentiality and discretion in order to
build trust.
However, if the laws and policies regulating body camera use are
to be sustainable, trust must be ensured throughout the lifecycle of
data, not just at the point of surveillance and capture. This means that
state actors and verified, accountable third-party vendors that obtain
body-camera data must be discreet in who the data is disclosed to
(either as a public record or bulk data exchange), must protect the
data from leaks to unauthorized third parties by engaging in
reasonable data security and denitrification, and must be honest with
those being surveilled and the public at large about when surveillance
is occurring and their data is being processed.
Some policies seem to actively state that people cannot trust
police officers with their personal information. For example,
Cincinnati’s policy dispels any notion that officers might be discrete
with surveillance subjects by stating that “[u]nlike the back of a police
car or empty police interrogation room, which requires notification
recording equipment is in use, the personal contact between an
individual and an officer does not constitute an environment where
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.”143

140. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (discussing the concept of information fiduciaries).
141. PHILA. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 107, at 4.
142. AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL: BODY WORN CAMERA SYSTEMS
§ 303.2.5(d) (1–2) (2017), http://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Police/policy_9
-28-17.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4HC-7PLY].
143. CINCINNATI POLICE DEP’T, supra note 112, at 2.
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Perhaps one of the largest benefits that would come from a focus
on trust instead of a general expectation of privacy is that it would
ameliorate the harshness that often results from the application of the
third-party doctrine, which treats disclosures to anyone, no matter
how trusted, as a waiver of privacy rights.144 There may be many
instances in which disclosures to third parties carry no implication of
or need for trust in a police officer, government, or third party. But,
the doctrine applies harshly in instances where people make
themselves vulnerable to officers when they need help, for example,
when they need to report that they are in an abusive relationship.
Without the protections of privacy and confidentiality and with a
camera pointed right on them, victims of abuse might be hesitant to
report abuse, seek help, or fully confide in others.145
2. Obscurity Reveals the Fallacy of “No Privacy in Public”
Obscurity is the notion that, when information is hard or unlikely
to be found, it is relatively safe.146 People rely upon this obscurity all
the time. In work with Evan Selinger and Fred Stutzman, I have
explored the concept of obscurity as an essential component of
modern notions of privacy.147 Every day we make decisions about
where we go, what we do, and what we share based upon how obscure
we think we are. Most of our information online is obscure as well.
We use passwords, privacy settings, and disappearing messages to
make information hard to be found by the wrong audience. Think of
obscurity as the counterpart to trust. When we can reliably trust

144. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 140, at 1230 (arguing against the third-party doctrine’s
assumption that when people disclose information to a third party, the disclosers have “no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information” and proposing, instead, that many
third parties “owe us fiduciary duties or duties of confidentiality”); Kiel BrennanMarquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORD. L. REV. 611, 611, 616 (2015) (arguing
that the third-party doctrine should be limited where a person shares information with an
“information fiduciary”). But see Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) (defending the third-party doctrine).
145. See Fan, supra note 85, at 438–39.
146. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way To Think About
Your Data Than ‘Privacy,’ ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013), http://http://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy
/267283 [https://perma.cc/FA9K-B2TQ].
147. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L.
REV. 385, 388 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online
Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9, 11 (2013) [hereinafter Hartzog & Stutzman, Online
Obscurity]; Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy, in ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 2 (Joseph Pitt & Ashley Shew eds.,
forthcoming 2018).
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people, we have less of a need to be obscure. However, in contexts
where there is no one to trust, obscurity becomes invaluable.
Unlike trust, obscurity is not a widely established concept in law
or policy. Obscure is defined as “[n]ot readily noticed or seen;
inconspicuous; . . . Not clearly understood or expressed; ambiguous or
vague.”148 It is a simple concept that involves at least two parties: the
individual and the observer. “An individual is obscure to an observer
if the observer does not possess or comprehend critical information
needed to make sense of the individual.”149 For example, does an
observer know your personal identity, social connections, or the
context in which you disclosed something about yourself? Without
this information, an observer has a limited ability to make sense of
what you do and what you say. You are just a face in the crowd.
Finding this information is often costly.150 In the language of privacy
as obscurity, transaction costs are a good thing.
When we are obscure, we are protected by an observer’s inability
to comprehend our actions. We seek to be obscure in our everyday
lives. We close doors, talk in hushed tones, and take risks of very
briefly exposing ourselves, comfortable that the odds of adverse
results are low. Without a sense of obscurity, we would be forced to
assume that everything we do outside of our homes and physician’s
offices is going to be observed, stored, or used. People simply do not
have the resources or ability to protect against that kind of threat
model.
Obscurity provides an alternative for those who revolt at the idea
that there is “no privacy in public.” Many body-camera laws and
policies are built around the notion that surveillance is “public,” poses
no privacy threats and is therefore justified.151 For example, the
Dallas Police Department policy provides that “[w]hile in public
areas, officers are not required to advise a subject that they are
recording their interaction unless the subject specifically asks if they
are being recorded, at which point the officer will inform the subject
that they are being recorded.”152 The Dallas Police Department’s
body-camera policy also states that “[o]fficers are not required to
148. Obscure, THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENG. LANGUAGE (5th ed.
2018), http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=obscure [https://perma.cc/27W55Q8P].
149. Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 147, at 5.
150. Id. at 4.
151. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.825 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. and First
Special Sess.) (“[D]ata are public if a subject of the data requests it be made accessible to
the public.”).
152. DALL. POLICE DEP’T GEN. ORDER, supra note 113, at § 332.04(A)(5).
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obtain consent from a private person when in a public place or in a
location where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. It is at
the discretion of the officer to determine if they want to announce a
recording is occurring.”153 The Oklahoma City Police Department
policy states “[e]ach officer shall activate his or her body-worn
camera in the following circumstances: 1. Voluntary contact (only in a
public place or a place where the public and the officer have a right to
be).”154
The question of what is public, however, is often just a plot on
the spectrum of things that range from completely obscure to totally
obvious or known. People’s risk calculus is often built around how
obscure they are, not whether what they do is theoretically accessible
by someone.155 Rather, they care whether what they are doing at any
one particular time and context is likely to be seen, preserved,
disseminated, or used against them later.156 The calculus for what
makes things obscure is complex and includes many different factors,
such as search visibility, permanence, comprehensibility,
identifiability, and the resources, motivation, and pre-existing
knowledge of those who seek to surveil or make use of data. These
factors should be better valued when formulating accounts of what
public information is or what constitutes being “in public.”
Additionally, the idea that there is no privacy in public is
problematic because the notion of “public” is itself an undertheorized
and amorphous construct. Torts, statutes, and constitutional
amendments dictate that there can be “no privacy in public
information.”157 Yet courts, lawmakers, and society have no consistent
153. Id. at § 332.04(A)(4)–(5).
154. OKLA. CITY POLICE DEP’T: OPERATIONS MANUAL § 188.30 (2016),
https://www.okc.gov/home/showdocument?id=9198 [https://perma.cc/UJ6A-43GT]; see
also SAN JOSE POLICE BODY CAMERA POL’Y § 7, http://www.sjpd.org/InsideSJPD
/BodyCameras/SJPD_BWC_Policy_06-29-15_with_POA_approval.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PSQ6-N2BP] (“Generally, officers are not required to advise or obtain consent to utilize
the body-worn camera from a private person when: A. In a public place; or B. In a
location where there is an expectation of privacy (e.g., inside a building or dwelling) but
the officer is lawfully present.”). But see AURORA POLICE DEP’T DIRECTIVES MANUAL,
supra note 112, at § 16.4.4 (“The body-worn camera will not be activated in public places
where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, such as locker rooms, changing rooms, or
restrooms unless the activation is for the purpose of official law enforcement activity.”).
155. See, e.g., Frederic Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social
Media 769–77 (publication in the Proceedings for the ACM 2012 conference on Comp.
Supported Coop. Work) (2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1566904 [https://perma.cc/UZ2V-ZB26].
156. Id. at 773–76.
157. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 409–10 (2005); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1986); United States v.
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conceptualization for “public” or “public information.” In everyday
conversation and even within regulatory schemes, what constitutes
public information is essentially based on a hunch.158
Body-camera law could correct this problem by refusing to let
broad, descriptive notions of “public” dictate legal protection. Up to
this point, courts have looked to see if society classifies something as
“public” and shapes the law accordingly. We should flip that
approach. Designating information as public is not and should not be
a clinical, empirical judgment, but a normative one meant to shape
outcomes and serve values. Lawmakers and departments should
formulate rules aimed at preserving the obscurity of people and their
data to guide rules for protection. In other work, I have criticized the
concept of “obscurity lurches,” that is, actions like the use of facial
recognition technology or making information searchable and easily
accessible in ways that violate people’s relied upon zones of
obscurity.159
The main problem with the reasonable expectations of privacy
test is not the “reasonableness” approach, which is a foundational
concept in various areas of the law.160 The problem lies in the concept
of privacy itself. Even a focus on “reasonable expectations of
obscurity” might be more useful. A reasonableness approach to
obscurity would be more focused than the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” standard because it would direct authorities to identify and
evaluate contextual factors like perceived structural protections,
threat modeling, and other things that would seem to make the cost of
finding or understanding information high and, as a result, unlikely to
occur. In other words, at least the concept of a reasonable expectation
of obscurity would more directly identify specific factors like signals
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–46 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J.
406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996); Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953); Moreno v.
Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 862–63 (Cal Ct. App. 2009); Melvin v. Reid,
297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
158. For more regarding this critique, see generally Solove, supra note 14 (arguing that
“the regulation of public records in the United States must be rethought in light of the new
technologies in the Information Age”) and Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information
Fallacy, 98 B.U. L. Rev (forthcoming 2018) (Northeastern Univ. Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 309-2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3084102
[https://perma.cc/4YMD-N34K] (theorizing that the “no privacy in public” justification is
“misguided” due to the lack of a clear definition of the word “public”).
159. Hartzog, supra note 51, at 966–70.
160. See generally Benjamin Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law,
163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2015) (analyzing the imbrication of “reasonableness” and
negligence law).
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and transaction costs that can more accurately and consistently define
a legal threshold.
3. Autonomy Justifies Requiring Authorization
Finally, body-camera rules should serve the autonomy of those
surveilled. In order to flourish, people need some degree of freedom
from external control or influence. To many, autonomy is the reason
privacy is important. This notion is at the heart of the “right to be let
alone” articulation of privacy developed so many years ago by
Warren and Brandeis.161 Alan Westin, one of privacy’s most famous
theorists, wrote that the most significant threat to one’s autonomy is
the notion that someone might violate one’s “inner zone” to learn
their deepest secrets.162 Westin wrote, “This deliberate penetration of
the individual’s protective shell, his psychological armor, would leave
him naked to ridicule and shame and would put him under the control
of those who knew his secrets.”163
Autonomy is at the core of a number of developed theories of
privacy. Julie Cohen argued, “[a] protected zone of informational
autonomy is valuable, in short, precisely because it reminds us what
we cannot measure.”164 Helen Nissenbaum observed that the
relationship between privacy and autonomy can be thought of in
three different ways: (1) control over the information itself, (2)
contributing to an environment where individual autonomy will
flourish, and (3) as creating space for individuals to follow through on
autonomous decisions.165

161. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193–95 (1890).
162. ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967).
163. Id.
164. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–26 (2000); see also Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in
NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 169, 173–74, 181 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1971) (arguing that informational privacy is desirable because it permits individual selfdetermination over how one appears and to whom, and concluding that “an offense to
privacy is an offense to autonomy”); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy:
Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 454 (1983) (stating that
autonomy includes the right to decide “what personal information to disclose,” or conceal,
from others); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 483, 475–93 (1968) (“Privacy, thus, is
control over knowledge about oneself.”); Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy
Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2007) (favoring a “control-based definition of
privacy” that affords individuals the space to develop, “while maintaining autonomy over
the course and direction of one’s life”).
165. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 81–83 (2009).
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One key way to serve people’s autonomy is to give them control
over when they are surveilled and how their data is processed.
Control is often given through rules requiring “consent” from
surveillance and data subjects. An individual’s capacity for selfdetermination and freedom from external influence is then respected
when surveillance and data processing can occur only if the subject
agrees to it. Prohibiting surveillance without the consent of the
surveilled respects the agency of those being watched and helps
mitigate the power disparities inherent in surveillance.
I have been critical of data protection regimes that make use of
the concept of “consent” and “control” in the past.166 Too often, the
limitations of “consent” and “control” regimes are easily exploited by
those who seek to surveil and process data. People have limited
resources to process risk and make decisions regarding when they will
be watched and what is to be done with their personal information. If
too many requests are made of people, they risk making poor or illinformed decisions, and their autonomy is actually reduced, not
enhanced. When consent regimes are exploited, their main function is
to burden the data or surveillance subject with the costs and risk of
harm.167
However, the infrequency and potential danger of body camera
surveillance might counsel a prioritization of autonomy in certain
contexts. Requiring consent at the moment of surveillance can clarify
exactly what is happening and help individuals determine for
themselves whether an encounter is to be recorded and stored.
Additionally, giving surveillance subjects the deletion and other data
subject rights might be just as beneficial. Governments could borrow
the wisdom of data protection regimes around the world, which
embrace the fair information practices.168 These simple data collection
and processing principles give data subjects meaningful rights such as
rights of correction and deletion, among others. Given the likely

166. Hartzog, supra note 51, at 965–66; Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy and the Dark Side
of Control, IAI NEWS (Sep. 4, 2017), https://iainews.iai.tv/articles/privacy-the-dark-side-ofcontrol-auid-882 [https://perma.cc/U8KD-84JW] [hereinafter Hartzog, Privacy and the
Dark Side of Control]; see also Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting
Away Control Over Personal Information, 111 PA. ST. L. REV. 587, 610–13 (2007).
167. See Haynes, supra note 166, at 593–97; Idris Adjerid, Alessandro Acquisti &
George Loewenstein, Framing and the Malleability of Privacy Choices 2–4 (June 2014)
(unpublished paper prepared for the 2014 Workshop on the Economics of Information
Security, Pennsylvania State University, 2014), http://www.econinfosec.org/archive
/weis2014/papers/AdjeridAcquistiLoewenstein-WEIS2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FNF-V7G8];
Hartzog, Privacy and the Dark Side of Control, supra note 166.
168. Hartzog, supra note 51, at 952.
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volatile and sensitive nature of body camera recordings and how
vulnerable people are in police encounters, governments might even
implement some more robust version of a deletion right, akin to the
European Union’s “right to be forgotten” or the “sealed” nature of
certain juvenile records.169
Of course, consent could still be a problem for body camera
systems. First, it might not be feasible for an officer to get the consent
of everyone who will be captured on camera. This is likely why the
policies of most cities that require consent or permit deactivation
upon request limit the power of consent sometimes to particular
individuals like victims or witnesses who wish to make a statement
and residents of homes.170 Notification requirements might be easier
to implement as a default rule for everyone better than consent
requirements, even though these notification regimes widely vary in
their efficacy.171
The second problem is that people might feel pressured to give
consent for surveillance. The “I’ve got nothing to hide” argument
remains pervasive in both law and society, and the mere act of
requesting deactivation might cause officers and others to react
differently to or become suspicious of those who do not want to be
watched.172 Additionally, what should the policy be in circumstances

169. Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos, Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317; Expungement, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/expungement/#federal [https://perma.cc
/65YH-D8BG] (“[Forty-five] states and the District of Columbia provide for expungement
for some ex-offenders or other similar relief.”).
170. See, e.g., BALT. POLICE DEP’T BODY CAMERA POL’Y: EXCEPTIONS TO
RECORDING § 2 (2017), https://www.baltimorepolice.org/sites/default/files/Policies/824
_Body_Worn_Cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY7K-4KTV] (“When victims, witnesses or
other individuals wish to make a statement or share information during a voluntary
interaction with police, but refuse to do so while being recorded, members may Deactivate
the BWC in order to obtain the statement or information.”); BOS. POLICE DEP’T BODY
CAMERA POLICY § 2.3 (2016), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2016-07-12
%20Boston%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8UP-YAP3]
(“Before
entering a private residence without a warrant or in non-exigent circumstances, the BWC
officer shall seek the occupant’s consent to continue to record in the residence. If the
civilian declines to give consent, the BWC officer shall not record in the residence.”).
171. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & OMRI BEN-SHAHAR, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 173 (2014); BOS. POLICE DEP’T,
supra note 170, § 2.5 (“Notice of Recording: Unless there is an immediate threat to the
officer’s life or safety, making BWC notification impossible or dangerous, BWC officers
shall inform civilians that they are being recorded. BWC officers shall notify civilians with
language such as ‘Ma’am/Sir, I am advising you that our interaction is being recorded by
my Body Worn Camera.’ BWC officers shall not record civilians surreptitiously.”).
172. See DANIEL SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 21–32 (2011).
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where some people present at an officer interaction wish for the
camera to be turned on while others do not? Whose wishes should be
respected?173 There is no clear answer to these questions. One
possible strategy would be to give surveillance subjects more robust
data access, redaction, and deletion rights in the case of conflicting
requests regarding body-camera deactivation.
* * *
In sum, body-camera law and policy can largely avoid the
problems caused by the “reasonable expectations of privacy”
standard by creating rules built around trust, obscurity, and
autonomy. There are, of course, other values that body cameras
should also embrace that are relevant to surveillance and personal
data. For instance, surveillance and data protection invoke many
equality issues. People should be protected against targeted use of
body cameras based upon their race, religious beliefs, sexual
orientation, or other characteristics. For example, the Austin Police
Department policy prohibits using body cameras “[t]o monitor
persons based solely upon the person’s political or religious beliefs or
upon the exercise of the person’s constitutional rights to freedom of
speech and religious expression, petition, and assembly under the
United States Constitution, or because of the content or viewpoint of
the person’s protected speech.”174 The only way body cameras will be
safe and sustainable is if they can accommodate all of these values.
III. REFINING IMPLEMENTATION: DESIGNING A BETTER BODY
CAMERA SYSTEM
In addition to embracing more nuanced notions of privacy, body
cameras are an opportunity to create a holistic framework that
addresses both data practices and the design of information
technologies. In this Part, I make two arguments. First, body-camera
frameworks should include rules for the design of technologies.
Design is currently a bit of a blind spot for large areas of privacy
law.175 Lawmakers and courts outline rules for how information is to
be collected, used, and shared. But they are often silent on how
173. For a deeper exploration of the tension amongst those who share a common story
but have divergent exposure interests, see Sonja R. West, The Story of Us: Resolving the
Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and Information Privacy, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 589, 591–96 (2010). Perhaps one answer would be to require elevated authorization
process to record or perhaps vesting all those who object with additional rights of deletion
or redaction.
174. AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, supra note 142, at 303.2.5(d)(8).
175. See generally HARTZOG, supra note 14 (analyzing how technological designs are
slowly but steadily enabling privacy degradations).
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surveillance and data technologies are actually built and function.
These rules often do little to address the effect that powerful new
technologies have on people. For example, surveillance rules often do
not address the configuration and deployment of surveillance
technologies. Data protection rules sometimes ignore the default
settings for consumer-facing technologies or are silent on how far user
interfaces can go in shaping user expectations of privacy.176 In this
Part, I argue that the law and policy of body cameras can provide a
template and momentum for taking design more seriously in privacy
law generally.
Second, I propose a model framework for policymakers to
combine rules for data processing and surveillance as well as the
design of technologies for a holistic approach to privacy. This
approach is built around the lifecycle of data collection, storage,
processing, and disclosure. I propose data and design rules that serve
the values of trust, obscurity, and autonomy.
A. Design Will Determine the Value of Body Cameras
Design choices affect nearly every way in which body cameras
will be used. Each of these decisions matter. Someone must decide if
the cameras will collect video, audio, or both. Someone must decide if
the camera is going to be built and configured to be on by default, or
if it will be activated manually or automatically. Someone must decide
if the cameras are to be designed so that the data captured by the
camera is stored locally or remotely. Authorities must also decide
whether the data will be decrypted and/or redacted; how it will be
deleted and when, through what technology and format it will be
released; and whether redaction technologies will be used to obscure
the data.
Design is also power. Biometrics allow more people to be
surveilled and identified at a fraction of the cost. Alert lights and
sounds on body cameras can indicate to people when the camera is
activated. Encryption technologies can protect data against hackers
and snoops. And technologies designed to redact and blur can
mitigate the harm from public disclosure of surveillance.
176. Id. A few notable exceptions include biometrics laws in Illinois, Texas, and
Washington and the European Union’s requirement within its General Data Protection
Regulation to implement privacy by design and default. Rebecca Yergin, Washington
Becomes the Third State with a Biometric Law, INSIDE PRIVACY (May 31, 2017),
https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/state-legislatures/washington-becomes-the-third
-state-with-a-biometric-law/ [https://perma.cc/BH2J-XK5J]; see also Council Regulation
2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 7.
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Most importantly, design is political. People often say the design
of technologies can be neutral. “It’s the best available evidence that’s
neutral,” Steve Tuttle, vice president of communications at camera
company TASER, told The Wire.177 “It’s just an observer. The truth is
the truth.”178 Except when it’s not. The design of body cameras is
never neutral. Every body-worn camera system design decision makes
a certain reality (and perception of that reality) more or less likely.
For example, cameras that do not include a blinking “on” light will
result in less awareness of surveillance than those cameras that by
design indicate when they are in operation.179 As a result, design
reflects the prioritization of values by those who control and
implement systems. When buttons are easy to find and redundancies
are built in, there will be fewer mistakes turning on and off the
camera. Whether the camera is designed to be placed on the shoulder,
on a gun, or even on a drone, affects what is captured and how the
video will be perceived by the public.180 boyd and Rosenblat wrote,
Advocates imagine that [body cameras] will surveil the police,
but unlike most footage that has rallied the public, body-cam
footage does not make visible the facial expressions or
movements of the police officer’s body because it doesn’t face
the officer. Instead, it casts a spotlight on the other people
among whom police operate. Worse, it focuses attention on the
limited angles that can be seen from that vantage point. As any
videographer knows, camera angles matter. You can tell
radically different stories depending on the angle. For instance,
due to the average heights of male officers and the women they
encounter, a lapel camera can capture a steady stream of
cleavage when an officer is facing her.181
Even persistent surveillance only captures some of the story. Red
activation lights on body cameras and systems that allow for
deactivation upon request show respect for people’s autonomy.182 Use
of biometrics shows a lack of respect for people’s obscurity because
they can make things that were previously difficult to find, for
example your location or identity in a public place, easy to track.183
177. Shirley Li, The Big Picture: How Do Police Body Cameras Work?, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/08/how-do-policebody-camera-work/378940/ [https://perma.cc/3V6A-NG82].
178. Id.
179. Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 13.
180. Id. at 5; boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8.
181. boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8.
182. Mateescu el al., supra note 6, at 13.
183. Stoughton, supra note 8, at 1398.
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Design is important to get right because it is very difficult to
change once it is implemented. Governments choose to fund certain
kinds of systems with certain specifications. Contracts with vendors
are formed. Officers and employees are trained upon the equipment
that is decided upon. Policies and rules are built around the
capabilities of the equipment. This entrenches the design of the
technologies that are initially chosen and makes changing them
difficult. As a result, the time to focus on the design of body cameras
is now, before they become fully entrenched and the rules become set
in stone.184
B.

Guides for Designing a Body Camera Obscura

What should design rules for body cameras look like? As an
initial matter, of course body-camera policies should address more
than just privacy. Safe, sustainable body-camera laws and policies
require a careful balancing of sometimes competing interests and
ethics beyond the scope of this Article.185 Different cities and states
have different needs, resources, and values.
Instead, this Part suggests a series of guides, default
presumptions, and possible boundaries, rights, or systems that could
be used to create better rules for privacy that also can serve values of
justice, due process, accountability, and free speech. I use the concept
of obscurity to develop a guiding ethic for body cameras and privacy:
To best protect privacy while still retaining the utility of body
cameras, surveillance and the subsequent data collection, use, and
dissemination should be “hard but possible” and proportional to
allowances elsewhere in the system.186
The best way to follow this ethic and ensure privacy while also
providing for accountability is to take an accounting of the body
camera system as a whole, rather than assessing the merit of
individual privacy protections and surveillance and data process
allowances in isolation. To do that, we must follow the data. In her
article on body cameras, Elizabeth Joh ask a series of questions that
follow the data lifecycle, such as “Who controls the data?” and how
will it be stored, processed and shared?187 Mateescu, Rosenblat and
boyd ask questions along the same data lifecycle, such as “When Will
Cameras Be Running, and How Will Subjects Know?”; “How Long

184.
185.
186.
187.

boyd & Rosenblat, supra note 8.
Id.; Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 8.
Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 49 (2008).
Joh, supra note 3, at 133–35.
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Will Law Enforcement Agencies Retain Footage, and Who Can See
It?”, “How Is Footage Secured?”; and “When Can Biometrics Be
Collected or Used?”188 These questions loosely plot along what some
conceptualize as the four major stages of a data lifecycle: collection,
storage, processing, and dissemination.
These are also the four places where design decisions can support
more nuanced conceptualizations of privacy such as trust and
obscurity. Lawmakers and departments should strive to protect
privacy by ensuring these values are proportionally respected
throughout a body camera system. If there is a need for more
surveillance and data processing at the collection point, then perhaps
more robust obscurity and trust protections could be given to data
subjects at the storage, processing, and dissemination stage.
Permissive surveillance rules could dictate more robust redaction and
deletion rights for data subjects and greater restrictions on access.
And if the risks of surveillance or data processing are too great to
compensate for downstream, then those particular acts of surveillance
or data practices should be prohibited.
1. Data Collection
To protect obscurity, body cameras should, by default, be
inactive until a set time, condition, or action. If the cameras are set to
sense and record by default, they will be tools of persistent
surveillance. Body-camera advocates might have several reasons to
adopt a persistent surveillance regime. It maximizes the amount of
camera footage and, thus, the perception of transparency. It might be
easier for law and policy makers to carve out narrow exemptions
rather than to articulate narrow activation triggers.189 Persistent
surveillance regimes also allow police departments to limit officer
discretion over when to activate and deactivate the cameras.
However, a default for persistent surveillance also creates a host
of problems because it is costly to store, curate, redact, and manage
access to the footage.190 It will inevitably result in less obscurity and
more exposure, often when people are at their most vulnerable.
Automated triggers could help solve the problem with officer
discretion while simultaneously fostering people’s obscurity by
enacting rules that the cameras are to remain off until activated.191
188. Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 9, 14, 19, 22.
189. Id. at 10.
190. Joh, supra note 3, at 134.
191. The ACLU’s Jay Stanley has written “The balance that needs to be struck is to
ensure that officers can’t manipulate the video record, while also placing reasonable limits
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For example, tech companies are experimenting with and marketing
body camera technologies that automatically activate according to
certain triggers that might indicate the need for video surveillance,
such as when a gun is drawn from a holster, when a police cruiser’s
door is opened or lights and sirens are activated, or when raised
voices are detected or an officer’s pulse is quickened.192 A built-in
historical buffer can ensure that the prior few minutes leading up to
activation are also captured.193 The goal for lawmakers and police
departments looking to protect privacy should be creating just enough
data to serve very clearly articulated purposes, such as video evidence
of the use of force or contentious police encounters, not a general
surveillance and storage mandate.
With some imagination, lawmakers and police departments could
also fashion rules about what kinds of information were collected by
body-camera sensors upon automated triggers. For example, perhaps
tiers of risk could be envisioned whereby the mere opening of a
cruiser’s door or voluntary activation of the camera by the officer
recorded only audio, whereby sirens, raised voices, and drawn guns
trigger both audio and high-quality video. Rules that limit recording
in certain venues such as homes, hospitals, and other places where
people are undressed or expect discretion would also help establish
zones of obscurity within which people can feel more protected from
digital surveillance.194
Lawmakers who seek to preserve trust between officers and the
public should also consider mandating obvious warnings to people
that the camera was on, such as a bright red, blinking recording light
as well as verbal notice when feasible.195 General prohibitions such as
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office mandate that “[body cameras] shall not
be used surreptitiously” are useful.196 They could be clarified with a
on recording in order to protect privacy. One possibility is that some form of effective
automated trigger could be developed that would allow for minimization of recording
while capturing any fraught encounters—based, for example, on detection of raised voices,
types of movement, etc.” Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies
in Place, A Win for All, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/police-body-mounted-camerasright-policies-place-win-all [https://perma.cc/4BVR-LN88].
192. Alex Pasternack, Police Forget to Turn on Body Cameras. Can Taser’s Connected
Holster Fix That?, FAST CO. (Feb. 28, 2017) https://www.fastcompany.com/3068594/taserconnected-holster-automatic-body-camera-recording [https://perma.cc/9PC6-U2Y6].
193. Id.
194. Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 13–14.
195. Id. at 13.
196. JACKSONVILLE, FLA. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, ORDER 463: BODY WORN CAMERA
POLICY
§ II.D.5
(2017),
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2017-07-18
%20Jacksonville%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MPS-USQU].
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design mandate that all body cameras have a clear signal to those
being surveilled that the camera is operating and recording. This
notification should be persistent and verbal notification should be a
requirement where feasible even in “public” spaces.197
Autonomy rules would vest some control over whether the
recording was turned on at all (or preserved) in the hands of victims
and third parties. These rules might include a permission requirement
and certain retention, deletion, and obscuring rights for surveillance
and data subjects. Even if full control for surveillance subjects is not
possible or feasible, policies should give officers some discretion to
honor requests to turn off body cameras.198 In sum, body camera data
collection should be obvious, sparse, as obfuscated to the extent
feasible, and possible for victims and third parties to control.
2. Data Storage
To store data is to create a privacy risk.199 Data is searchable and
persistent. It never deteriorates, unlike our memory, which naturally
obscures information and contexts. Stored data is also hackable.
Lawmakers should require that police departments and any thirdparty vendors take all reasonable measures to secure body-camera
data. Given the sensitivity of this information, this standard expects a
fair bit from departments and vendors.
Thankfully, lawmakers do not need to come up with a robust set
of data protection practices from scratch. They simply need to ensure
that departments and vendors adhere to the same full set of principles
for ideal data stewardship as those in industry who collect and process
personal information. This means articulating rules around data and
risk identification; the necessary technical, physical, and
administrative safeguards for personal information; and breach
response plans. This might include mandated obscurity, data
197. See DALL. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 113, § 332.04.A.5 (“While in public areas,
officers are not required to advise a subject that they are recording their interaction unless
the subject specifically asks if they are being recorded, at which point the officer will
inform the subject that they are being recorded.”).
198. “If a request is made for a BWC to be turned off by a party being contacted, the
officer should take into account the overall circumstances and what is most beneficial to
all involved, before deciding to honor the request. For example, an officer may choose to
turn off the BWC if its operation is inhibiting a victim or witness from giving a statement.
Factors to consider may include the type of call and the vulnerability of the victim, such as
the victim of a sexual assault.” MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN
CAMERAS § 4-223.IV.F.2 (2017), http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/policy/mpdpolicy
_4-200_4-200 [https://perma.cc/9B7F-66VP].
199. Paul Ohm, Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2012),
https://hbr.org/2012/08/dont-build-a-database-of-ruin [https://perma.cc/7FY3-8QW3].
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protection, and security impact assessments of particular policies and
design choices, mandated encryption, and other de-identification and
access controls such as hashing, salting, and “scrubbing” data.200 It
also might include rules about ensuring the security of data in transit
from the camera to the cloud storage, or perhaps even a local storage
on the camera with specific transfer times and mechanisms that do
not require the camera itself to be connected to the internet.
Perhaps just as importantly in terms of storage, lawmakers
should mandate regular deletion as well as give data subjects deletion
rights. These are not easy lines to draw. Mateescu, Rosenblat, and
boyd note that there is no generally agreed upon time or formula to
determine how long footage is to be kept.201 They note that there are
many factors to be considered, including the cost of retention, what
types of footage to keep and flag for review, how long to keep footage
that has value in investigations or as evidence, the risk of retained
footage being misused for unconstitutional or harmful surveillance,
and the risk “that footage can be analyzed to divergent purposes, with
differing and prescribed rules for access, review, and analysis.”202 Joh
wrote, “[t]he few states that have addressed body-worn camera video
storage limits have generally erred on the side of limiting video
storage unless it is involved in a criminal investigation.”203 She notes
that the tradeoff is difficult because there are several advantages to
longer storage times:204
Shorter storage times means there is less data (of the innocent
as well as the guilty) available for inspection and analysis. Yet
longer data storage periods may enhance public accountability
if it means that the public—citizens, journalists, and
researchers—can access video that can illuminate individual
cases as well as general policing practices.205
But these lines mandating deletion after a certain time and upon
certain requests must be drawn. The alternative is persistent
retention, which is a risk to people’s obscurity and autonomy. While it
is costly to create a system to protect and scrub data, flag certain data

200. See, e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91
WASH. L. REV. 703, 743 (2016). Hashing, salting, and “scrubbing” data are all concepts
that involve changing certain characteristics of data to make it unintelligible, inaccessible,
or de-identified.
201. Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 14.
202. Id.
203. Joh, supra note 3, at 135.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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for retention, and delete the rest, this is a minimum price for the safe
implementation of body cameras.
3. Data Processing
Data can be processed in ways that destroy obscurity and erode
people’s trust and autonomy. Industry already processes data and
uses algorithms in inscrutable and dangerous ways.206 As a starting
matter, governments and departments that are particularly committed
to privacy might even consider adopting some of the framework of
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation for
data.207 This framework prohibits data processing without a legitimate
reason.208 Academics and governments have written volumes on the
virtues of a data protection framework.209 This Article merely
proposes it as an established guide for the development of fair data
processing rules, with a preference for design restrictions instead of
consent of the data subject as a legitimatization lever.
However, protecting obscurity and trust might require more.
Lawmakers should create rules to prevent obscurity lurches like the
use of biometrics and disloyal repurposing of data. Biometrics are a
particular area of concern for body cameras. The Police Executive
Research Forum (“PERF”) report states that “Body-worn cameras
raise many privacy issues that have not been considered before.
Unlike many traditional surveillance methods, body-worn cameras
can simultaneously record both audio and video and capture close-up
images that allow for the potential use of facial recognition
technology.”210 The Leadership Conference argued that “[b]iometric
evaluation of footage must be strictly limited to narrow, well-defined
uses, and subject to judicial authorization.”211 I agree. Facial
206.
207.
208.
209.

See PASQUALE, supra note 54, at 216.
Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 7–8.
Id.
See generally COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF
PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2003) (discussing privacy
protections in a global context); GRAHAM GREENLEAF, ASIAN DATA PRIVACY LAWS:
TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES (2014) (discussing privacy laws in Asia);
Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J.
115 (2017) (addressing privacy protection measures in the European Union and the
United States).
210. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA
PROGRAM:
RECOMMENDATIONS
AND
LESSONS
LEARNED
11
(2014),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP63
-GPBF]. PERF sent out a survey to 500 agencies, of which 254 responded. Id. at 2.
211. Letter from Wade Henderson, President & CEO, Leadership Conference on Civil
& Human Rights (“LCCHR”), & Nancy Zirkin, Exec. Vice President, LCCHR, to the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc
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recognition should be an exceptional event. Biometrics allow for
dramatic lurches in obscurity. Elsewhere, I have explored with Evan
Selinger about why facial recognition is a corrosive menace to our
cherished obscurity.212 We argued that people don’t have the
expectation they will be practically monitored everywhere they go,
nor do they have the ability to fully embrace paranoid riskmanagement strategies to hide from surveillance.213 Rather, we have
always been able to “hide in plain sight.”214 We argue that
“[u]biquitous and unrestrained facial recognition technologies
wouldn’t just alter this longstanding presumption, it would shatter it
entirely.”215
Lawmakers should either prohibit the use of facial recognition
technologies outright or subject them to procedural protections like
mandatory privacy impact assessments before implementation and
judicial authorization before use. Additionally, lawmakers should
limit the reuse of data collected by body cameras for other facial
recognition programs. As I have written elsewhere with Evan
Selinger, the full potential of facial-matching technologies requires a
comprehensive name-face database to compare with current
surveillance images.216
There will likely be a great incentive or demand for police
departments to share the data and biometrics databases with others.
But if we value autonomy and obscurity and all the benefits of
freedom from surveillance, lawmakers should create rules against the
use of body-camera data for facial recognition.
Additionally, lawmakers should establish rigid rules limiting or
prohibiting the reuse of data collected by body cameras. One of the
key tenets of fair information process is what some call “purpose
limitation.”217 This key ethic has been described by many as having
/pdfs/2015-01-30-letter-to-task-force-on-21st-century-policing.pdf [https://perma.cc/AVS4MG7M].
212. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Opinion: It’s Time for an About-Face on
Facial Recognition, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 22, 2015),
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0622/Opinion-It-s-timefor-an-about-face-on-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/6TAP-JXDC].
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, I See You: The Databases That FacialRecognition Apps Need to Survive, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2014/01/i-see-you-the-databases-that-facial-recognition-apps-need-tosurvive/283294/ [ https://perma.cc/L5P3-KGB6].
217. See Opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on “Purpose
Limitation” 00569/13/EN, WP 203, at 3–5 (Apr. 2, 2013). But see Lokke Moerel & Corien
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two parts: the first, often referred to as “purpose specification,” holds
that “data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes only,” and the second, often referred to as “compatible
use,” holds that “data must not be further processed in a way that is
incompatible with those purposes.”218 In essence, data collected for
one very specific purpose cannot and should not be used for another
incompatible purpose. This is a key data ethic that underlies many
international data protection regimes, including Europe’s General
Data Protection Regulation.219
Given the sensitive nature of the information collected by body
cameras, mere purpose limitations might not be enough. In previous
research, I have argued with Neil Richards that part of the duty of
trust includes a duty of loyalty—a data processor’s obligation to avoid
self-dealing at the expense of those who trust them.220 We wrote that
many of our fears about big data are really fears about organizations
being disloyal to us and using information in ways adverse to us.221
Will big data analytics deny us meaningful opportunities such as
mortgages or jobs?222 Will big data redlining have a disparate impact
on minority and marginalized populations?223
Lawmakers should prohibit departments and vendors from
reusing information not just in ways incompatible with the purpose
specified for collection, but also in disloyal ways. This means limiting
those who can access data and making governments and third-party
vendors promise not to engage in self-dealing. One way to prevent
the incentive to reuse information in disloyal ways is to ensure that
governments pay for vendor services with money, not data. As we
have seen, the dominant business model on the web in which
technology companies offer free services in exchange for personal

Prins, On the Death of Purpose Limitation, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS
(Jun. 2, 2015) https://iapp.org/news/a/on-the-death-of-purpose-limitation/ [https://perma.cc
/Q6TM-QXC2] (arguing that the purpose limitation test is outdated and should be
replaced by a test based on legitimate interest).
218. Id.
219. Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 35. (“Personal data shall be
collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a
manner that is incompatible with those purposes; further processing for archiving purposes
in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall,
. . . not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes.”).
220. Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 131, at 469–71.
221. Id. at 471.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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information, is a model for exploitation.224 Elizabeth Joh has
chronicled the corrosive influence that body-camera vendors have
over body-camera policy.225 Lawmakers must create rules to counter
the power incentives for department and vendor exploitation.
4. Data Dissemination
Finally, lawmakers and courts must determine when data is
disclosed and to whom. There are many possible considerations
regarding the release of body-camera data. Answering them will
involve confronting the traditional journalistic aspects of a story: Who
can access the data? What can they access? When and where can they
access the data? And how can they access the data?
Instead of binary rules that either keep information locked up or
release to the public for any and all uses, it might be best to use the
relative obscurity and confidentiality of information as a slider to
determine the extent to which information is protected and released.
Some parties might have more access than others based on their need
for information. Other kinds of data might be less sensitive or better
obscured, for example with faces or sound blurred out or the entire
screen blurred with a filter.
In confronting the many different factors relevant to disclosure,
lawmakers might consider adopting rules that leverage promises of
trust through contracts and rules that limit things like commercial use
of body cameras or attempts at re-identification. Lawmakers might
also consider innovative redaction, blurring, video-only, audio-only,
and other redaction techniques. The goal of a safe disclosure regime
is to tailor the disclosure to the need to serve the multiple values of
privacy, due process, and government accountability.
As an initial matter, body-camera policies can probably better
balance privacy with other values by differentiating who is allowed to
access the records. Many policies already reflect this differentiation.226
224. See HARTZOG, supra note 14, at 1–5; Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington,
Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606,
608–12 (2014).
225. Joh, supra note 5, at 112–17.
226. For example, the Las Vegas body camera policy provides that
[t]o timely process requests and ensure that privacy rights, confidentiality laws,
and laws regarding the release of criminal history are complied with, the
Department has classified requestors into three general categories. These
categories are: (1) Media; (2) Involved Citizens (may include attorney
representatives with letters of representation and client authorization); and (3)
General Public. Each group necessitates slightly different procedures. These
procedures are outlined below by category.
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Putting aside important questions over access to evidence, in order to
protect their autonomy, those who have been surveilled should be
guaranteed access or at least a presumption of access to body camera
data. Some policies already provide this. For example, the Newark
Police Department has a policy to tag recordings that raise privacy
concerns and limit access to those tagged recordings.227
One important problem to protect against is officers accessing
records for retaliation purposes or just general snooping. This can be
a violation of trust, obscurity, and autonomy. The ACLU has
advocated that “[t]he use of recordings should be allowed only in
internal and external investigations of misconduct, and where the
police have reasonable suspicion that a recording contains evidence of
a crime.”228 “Otherwise,” according to the organization, “there is no
reason that stored footage should even be reviewed by a human being
before its retention period ends and it is permanently deleted.”229
Snooping in entrusted and generally inaccessible information is
disloyal and serves the interests of the voyeur only. Provisions should
be put in place to prohibit it.230
LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, BODY WORN CAMERA RECORDINGS,
https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/Body-Worn-Camera-Recordings.aspx [https://perma.cc
/45ZS-FZQN].
227. The Newark Police Division’s body-worn camera policy states:
To identify BWC recordings that may raise special, privacy or safety issues,
officers shall tag recordings. Recordings containing any of the following shall be
tagged: 1) The image of a victim of a criminal offense; 2) The image of a child; 3)
Images in a residential premise (e.g., home, apartment, college dormitory room,
hotel/motel room, etc.), a school or youth facility, healthcare facility or medical
office, substance abuse or mental health treatment facility, or a place of worship.);
4) Conversation with a person whose request to deactivate the BWC was denied;
5) Special operations event or execution of an arrest and/or search warrant where
confidential tactical information may have been recorded; 6) The image of an
undercover officer or confidential informant; 7) The screen of a law enforcement
computer monitor that is displaying confidential personal or law enforcement
sensitive information.
NEWARK POLICE DIV., BWC POLICY § VII(5), http://npd.newarkpublicsafety.org
/bodyworncamera/policy [https://perma.cc/CRZ4-ARSP].
228. Stanley, supra note 191.
229. Id.
230. For example, the Ferguson Police Department policy states that “General access
to digital recordings shall be granted to Department-authorized users only. It is the
responsibility of authorized users to keep their username and password confidential.
Accessing, copying, or releasing any recordings for other than official law enforcement
purposes is strictly prohibited, except as required by law or this policy and procedure.”
FERGUSON OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, GENERAL ORDER PR481.6: AUTHORIZED
USER ACCESS TO UPLOADED MEDIA OR DATA, (2016), https://www.bwcscorecard.org
/static/policies/2016-02-26%20Ferguson%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN46
-A8MG]. The Las Vegas policy states that “Employees, other than those assigned to the
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Finally, lawmakers must seek to facilitate public disclosure of
body-camera data in a safe, sustainable way. Public records law is the
primary vehicle for dissemination of government information and
facilitation of government transparency. Mateescu, Rosenblat, and
boyd write that “[p]ublic records laws are intended to grant citizens
access to government records. This raises a question of whether bodyworn camera video is a public record, and if so, whether it may or
must be disclosed.”231 Each state has different rules about which
records are to be made public and which are to be withheld under
certain exceptions for things like privacy, trade secrets, and ongoing
investigations.
Mateescu, Rosenblat, and boyd summed up the different views
on public disclosure of body camera footage and data:
According to the ACLU, policymakers must “carefully
balance,” “the need for government oversight and openness,
and privacy,” when creating policies about public disclosure. To
do that, it suggests flagging those videos “for which there is the
highest likelihood of misconduct” and redacting video “when
feasible” and asserts that unredacted video should only be
publicly disclosed with the consent of the subject. However,
redacted video and unredacted flagged video should be subject
to disclosure, and according to the Leadership Conference,
redacted footage should be made available for non-commercial
public interest purposes, with the right protections for witnesses
and victims. PERF suggests that agencies should have clear
protocols for releasing recorded data to the public, consistent
with public disclosure laws.232
Regarding what kinds of data parties can access, certain policies
limit the public disclosure of information that is “private” or vaguely
“confidential.” The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department has a
policy that limits disclosure if “[t]he recording contains information
that is otherwise confidential or exempt from disclosure or release

Body Camera Detail, Internal Affairs, Force Investigative Team (FIT) or Critical Incident
Review Team (CIRT) shall not download, copy, or record BWC recordings from
Evidence.com onto any computer, device, drive, CD/DVD, or any other format without
the express written consent of the Body Camera Detail Lieutenant,” and “Employees
shall not publish or display BWC recordings to the internet or social media sites.” LAS
VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, EVIDENCE AND PROPERTY PROCEDURES § 5/210.01:
BODY WORN CAMERAS (2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2015-10%20
Las%20Vegas%20-%20BWC%20Policy.pdf, [https://perma.cc/DZK5-8398].
231. Mateescu et al., supra note 6, at 18.
232. Id. at 19
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under State or federal law.”233 But these terms could use some
clarification. We’ve already discussed how the term privacy is not
helpful. When policies use the term “private,” do they mean
confidential? Obscure?
If they do mean confidential, the policy should clarify that it is
the data subject’s confidence that is to be kept, not a general wish for
secrecy that could mask a desire to protect against embarrassment.
Some examples would also be helpful besides simply “social security
numbers,” like the vague policy of the Columbus Police Department
which provides “[r]eleased video/audio footage will not contain any
confidential information such as social security numbers, personal
information about police officers, etc. unless expressly requested and
approved by the Chief of Police and the prosecuting attorney.”234
Confidence is ultimately determined by the terms of a relationship
and disclosure, even if the sensitive nature of information might affect
whether an implied confidence exists.
If the policy is meant to protect obscurity, then it should provide
a framework for determining the relative obscurity of information. I
have written in the past that obscurity is a combination of factors
including structural protections, cultural norms, and the desirability of
information by other parties.235 Online, obscurity is a product of lack
of searchability, limited access, de-identification, and opacity of
meaning.236 The more people rely upon being obscure, the greater
protections that might apply.
Access need not be granted on an all-or-nothing basis.
Information can be blurred and redacted to obscure sensitive aspects
of information while providing the public access to important
records.237 Seattle has taken the innovative step of releasing blurred

233. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEP’T, INTERACTIVE DIRECTIVES GUIDE
400-006: BODY WORN CAMERA (BWC) (2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static
/policies/2017-05-08%20Charlotte-Mecklenberg%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc
/F3TY-7B5P].
234. COLUMBUS POLICE, DEP’T STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 1.15, BODY
WORN VIDEO SYSTEM (2015), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/policies/2015-02-03
%20Columbus%20BWC%20Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H94-J9FS].
235. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1343, 1358 (2015); Hartzog & Stutzman, Online Obscurity, supra note 147,
at 21.
236. See Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 235, at 1358; Hartzog & Selinger, supra note
146.
237. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 88, at 1825–28 (2015); David S. Ardia, Privacy
and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of Practical Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1385 (2017).
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and obscured body camera data on YouTube.238 The data need not be
made available by default, either. Lawmakers might experiment with
releasing some information in limited formats, such as at a terminal in
person but not in an easily sharable digital format.
Finally, lawmakers might condition public access on a few
important rules. If the information has been redacted or de-identified,
lawmakers could prohibit attempts at re-identification through
technological means. Additionally, lawmakers might consider rules
that mitigate the problem of commercial entities clogging the public
records system with requests for records they can monetize in bulk.239
While lawmakers might consider prohibiting some kinds of egregious
bulk commercial uses of body camera data, Margaret Kwoka has
suggested the answer to the commercial public records problem is to
affirmatively disclose the kinds of records that are subject to routine
public records problems.240 It remains to be seen which actors will
make the most requests for body camera data. But it is clear that
lawmakers must try to carefully balance interests of access with
obscurity and autonomy interests.
CONCLUSION
If lawmakers keep applying the same privacy frameworks to the
rules for body cameras, they will get what they’ve always gotten: an
inconsistent set of rules that do not seem to match people’s actual
expectations of privacy and actually seem to facilitate the slow creep
toward more surveillance. It is hard to balance privacy with other
critical interests such as government accountability and free speech
when privacy is poorly defined. Privacy law has a blind spot when
lawmakers only focus more on when surveillance is conducted and
what people do with data and less on how data and surveillance
technologies are built. Body cameras are an opportunity to change
that. Or give us more of the same.

238. Wylie Wong & Phil Goldstein, Seattle Shares Body-Cam Footage on YouTube,
STATETECH (Jan. 21, 2016), https://statetechmagazine.com/article/2016/01/seattle-sharesbody-cam-footage-youtube [https://perma.cc/SE4B-664L].
239. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., supra note 92, at 1429–36.
240. Id.

